STEVEN ROBINSON, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act but found a sentencing error in Robinson's case, where the trial court imposed a fifteen-year concurrent sentence for cocaine possession when the applicable statutory sentence was five years. The Court remanded for resentencing.
The Court held that the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate separation of powers and rejected other constitutional challenges to the Act. The Court also held that Robinson's fifteen-year sentence for cocaine possession was illegal because it exceeded the five-year statutory sentence for a third-degree felony, and this sentencing error constituted fundamental error correctable on direct appeal.
[1] The Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution.
[2] A sentencing error resulting in a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum may be raised for the first time on appeal as fundamental error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act, as properly interpreted by the First District, does not violate separation of powers”
Establishes the Court's holding that the Act is constitutional
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobinson was convicted of possession of cocaine and sentenced to a fifteen-year concurrent prison releasee reoffender sentence by the trial court. The…
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PER CURIAM.
We have for review the decision in Robinson v. State, 742 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), in which the Fifth District certified the same question which was eer- tified in Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).1 We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 8(b)(4), Fla. Const. We recently approved the First District’s decision in Woods, holding that the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act, as properly interpreted by the First District, does not violate separation of powers, and rejecting other constitutional challenges to the Act. See State v. Cotton, Nos. SC94996 & SC95281, — So. 2d -, 2000 WL 766521 (Fla. June 15, 2000). Accordingly, for the reasons oppressed in Cotton, we answer the certified question in the negative and approve the Fifth District’s opinion with respect to that issue.
Robinson also challenges as illegal the concurrent, fifteen-year prison releas-ee reoffender sentence which the trial court imposed based on Robinson’s conviction for possession of cocaine. The applicable sentence appears to be five years. See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997) (providing five-year sentence for third-degree felony). This sentencing error is the type which may be raised for the first time on appeal2 by a defendant who has been sentenced during the “window” period prior to the Court’s decision in Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 8.800 & Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), 9.HO, & 9.600, 761 So. 2d 1015 (Fla.1999). See Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89 (Fla.2000)(indicating that “an un-preserved error resulting in a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum should be corrected on direct appeal as fundamental error”). We therefore quash the decision of the district court only to the extent that it can be interpreted as affirming Robinson’s sentence for possession of cocaine, and direct the district court to remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
. As framed in Woods, that question is:
DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOF-FENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?
. It is unclear from the record whether this unpreserved error was raised before the district court, or for the first time before this Court.
QUINCE, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, Nos. SC94996 <& SC95281, — So. 2d —, 2000 WL 766521 (Fla. June 15, 2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Kinney v. State, 808 So. 2d 1285 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…ncurrent terms of five years of incarceration followed by ten years of probation. These sentences are illegal, because they exceed the statutory maximum provided in section 775.082(9) for the third-degree felony convictions. See Robinson v. State, 762 So. 2d 909 (Fla.2000). And see Larson v. State, 572 So. 2d 1368, 1371 (Fla. 1991) (stating that a defendant cannot by agreement confer on a judge the authority to exceed the penalties established by law); Debord v. State, 802 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (re…
Authorities Cited
- Maddox v. State, 760 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2000)
- Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Amendments TO Fla. Rules OF Crim. Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800 & Fla. Rules OF App. Procedure 9.020(h), 791 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2001)
- Robinson v. State, 742 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Ervin v. State, 742 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)