EUGENE WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2000-06-28
No. 4D99-1764
KLEIN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
762 So. 2d 990 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 13 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Eugene Williams appealed his conviction after entering a nolo contendere plea to home invasion robbery and related charges. The trial court granted Williams's motion to withdraw his plea, but the state successfully moved to reconsider and reinstate the plea. The appellate court reversed, holding that once a plea withdrawal is granted and accepted, the court lacks authority to reconsider that decision.


Holding

The trial court lacked authority to reconsider the motion to withdraw the plea. Once a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is withdrawn and accepted by the court, it is as if the plea had never been entered, and the court cannot subsequently reconsider that decision.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court, after granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, is without authority to reconsider that decision.

[2] When a court permits a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the plea is considered as if it had never been entered.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“[QUOTE REDACTED — failed verbatim audit (paraphrase, not verbatim). See original_text for the text as originally displayed.]”

Establishes the underlying policy favoring withdrawal of pleas and trial on the merits

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Williams initially pleaded not guilty but changed his plea to nolo contendere at a January 26, 1999 hearing. At the March 6 sentencing hearing, Willia…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
HAZOURI, J.

HAZOURI, J.

Appellant, Eugene Williams, appeals from his conviction after entering a plea of nolo contendere for home invasion robbery with a firearm, battery on an elderly person while wearing a mask, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon while wearing a mask, and battery while wearing a mask. Williams raises two issues on appeal. We reverse on the first and the second is without merit. We address Williams’s first point that the trial court erred in granting the state’s motion to reconsider and set aside the trial court’s prior decision permitting Williams to withdraw his plea.

Williams had originally entered a plea of not guilty to the charges but decided to change his plea to nolo contendere. A hearing was held on January 26, 1999, to determine the status of his plea. The trial court found that Williams’s change of plea was voluntary under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172, accepted Williams’s plea of nolo contendere, and set the sentencing hearing for March 5, 1999. On February 9, 1999, appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea alleging that he had found evidence that could prove his innocence and he had a good chance of winning at trial.

At the sentencing hearing on March 6, when the trial judge asked if there was any legal cause why appellant should not be sentenced, appellant asked the court if he could withdraw his plea. The state objected and asserted that there was no basis to withdraw the plea. Appellant told the court that he had done some research and that the state could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was present when the crimes were committed. The trial court granted appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea and concluded the hearing.

That same day after the trial court proceeded with other'matters on its March 6 calendar, the prosecutor came before the court again. He stated that he had been caught “flat-footed” by appellant’s motion to withdraw. He had done some research which indicated there were not any legal grounds for permitting appellant to withdraw his plea and asked the court to reconsider its decision. Without any objection from appellant’s counsel, the trial court set the state’s motion down for a hearing on April 1,1999.

On March 22, 1999, appellant filed a pro se motion objecting to a rehearing on his plea withdrawal. At the hearing on April 1 the state argued that the trial court improperly permitted the withdrawal because nothing had changed since the plea of nolo contendere was taken and the plea of nolo contendere had not been as a result of a plea agreement. Appellant’s counsel argued that there was no legal basis for a rehearing and the original ruling should be upheld. Upon determining that no good cause grounds for withdrawal were presented, the trial court granted the state’s motion to reconsider and set aside the order granting the motion to withdraw the plea.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(f) provides that “[t]he court may in its discretion, and shall on good cause, at any time before a sentence, permit a plea of guilty to be withdrawn....” Rule 3,170(f) should be liberally construed in favor of the defendant as the law favors a trial on the merits. See Catinella v. State, 732 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). At the March 5 hearing appellant did not present evidence of good cause which would require the trial court to grant his motion to withdraw under the rule; however, the trial court exercised its discretion and granted the motion and set aside the plea.

The trial court was without authority to reconsider the motion to withdraw appellant’s plea. When a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is withdrawn and accepted by the court, it is as if the plea had never been entered ab initio. See Miles v. State, 620 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); State v. McClain, 509 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Bell v. State, 262 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 265 So. 2d 50 (Fla.1972). We therefore find that the trial court erred in granting the motion to reconsider and in setting aside appellant’s withdrawal of his plea. We reverse and remand for trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR TRIAL.

KLEIN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Donneco King v. State, 870 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
    …2d DCA 1987) [*71] (‘When the court set aside McClain’s original plea, it was as if a plea had never been entered ab initio, and the state had the option of prosecuting the defendant on the original charges.”) (citations omitted); Williams v. State, 762 So. 2d 990, 991 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (“When a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is withdrawn and accepted by the court, it is as if the plea had never been entered ab initio.”). We note that King’s competency has been a recurring issue in all of the proceedings…
  • Whitaker v. State, 881 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
    …d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). When a defendant successfully challenges and is permitted to withdraw a plea of nolo con-tendere or guilty which was entered as a result of a plea bargain, the negotiated plea bargain is “abrogated”. See Williams v. State, 762 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(explaining that when a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is withdrawn and accepted by the court, it is as if the plea had never been entered ab initio); Bell v. State, 262 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)(holding that when defendan…
  • Nicol v. State, 892 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
    …be used against the defendant in a trial of that cause. (Emphasis added). Our courts have consistently ruled that “[r]ule 3.170(f) should be liberally construed in favor of the defendant as the law favors a trial on the merits.” Williams v. State, 762 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Gray v. State, 754 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Here, the defendant is not challenging the trial court’s exercise of discretion, but instead, he argues that, as a matter of law, the trial court was required to permit him to…

Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw