ROBERT EARL GRIFFITH, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Earl Griffith was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of armed robbery stemming from 1992 crimes in South Dade. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of a co-defendant's prior consistent statement to rebut an implied charge of recent fabrication.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Benjamin's prior consistent statement. Under § 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997), a prior consistent statement is not hearsay when the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination, the statement is consistent with the testimony, and it is offered to rebut an express or implied charge of improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication.
[1] A prior consistent statement of a witness is admissible to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication, improper influence, or motive, provided the witness t…
[2] Impeachment of a witness through prior inconsistent statements can create an implication of recent fabrication, thereby opening the door for the admission of prior consis…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication.”
Sets forth the statutory exception allowing prior consistent statements to rebut charges of recent fabrication
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1992, Griffith and two co-defendants committed armed robberies and murders of a man and a woman in South Dade. Co-defendant Tony Benjamin entered a…
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PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for two counts of first degree murder and one count of armed robbery. We affirm.
In 1992, defendant was involved with two other co-defendants in the armed robberies and murders of a man and a woman in South Dade. The trial did not occur until July 1998. A co-defendant, Tony Benjamin, entered into a plea agreement with the State two and one-half years after the crime. Benjamin testified at defendant’s trial that defendant had brought the gun to the crime scene. On cross-examination, the defense impeached Benjamin with pri-or inconsistent statements from a pretrial deposition during which he had stated that he, not the defendant, had carried the gun to the murder scene. The State then announced that it intended to introduce a prior consistent sworn statement from Benjamin that defendant had carried the gun to the crime scene. The State argued that the statement was admissible under § 90.801, Fla. Stat. (1997), to rebut the implication that Benjamin had recently fabricated his testimony to align it with the State’s case. The prior consistent statement was admitted over defense objection; the defense claimed that it was not raising a claim of recent fabrication, but argued that Benjamin had fabricated the entire story from the beginning.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Benjamin’s prior consistent statement.
A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication.
§ 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). See also Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493, 500 (Fla.1992); See generally Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 801.8 (2000 ed.).
The record is clear that through impeachment, the defense was suggesting, either impliedly or expressly, that Benjamin had changed or fabricated his testimony. The prior consistent statement was necessary to rehabilitate him after his impeachment by the defense and was a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.
AFFIRMED;
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Fleitas v. State, 3 So. 3d 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…ay exception or are introduced to rehabilitate a witness or “to rebut an express or implied charge against the witness of improper influence, motive or recent fabrication.” Gardner v. State, 480 So. 2d 91, 93 (Fla.1985). See e.g., Griffith v. State, 762 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (“The prior consistent statement was necessary to rehabilitate [the witness] after his impeachment by the defense and was a recognized exception to the hearsay rule.”); Monday v. State, 792 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 20…
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Valentine v. State, 307 So. 3d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020)…ition rebutted the implication that he changed his description of the defendant after watching the news and surveillance video. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting his prior consistent statement. See, e.g., Griffith v. State, 762 So. 2d 1022, 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding prior consistent statement was admissible to rebut implication of fabrication). In short, the court did not err in admitting the manager’s prior consistent statement. • Issue Three: The Admission of the Childhood…
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- Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1992)