LEONARDO GONZALES, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 2000-07-06
No. SC97066
Wells, C.J., Shaw, J., Harding, J., Anstead, J., Pariente, J., Lewis, J., Quince, J.
763 So. 2d 282 Florida Supreme Court (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court held that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act does not violate the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution.


Holding

The Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act, codified as section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes, does not violate the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution.


Headnotes

[1] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act does not violate the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution when properly interpreted.

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Facts & Procedural History

Leonardo Gonzales was subject to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act. The Third District Court of Appeal certified a question of great publi…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review the decision in Gonzales v. State, 762 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), in which the district court certified the same question of great public importance which was certified in Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999):

DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOFFENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?

762 So. 2d at 920. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We recently approved the First District’s decision in Woods, holding that the Prisoner Releasee Reoffender Act, as properly interpreted by the First District, does not violate separation of powers, and rejecting other constitutional challenges to the Act. See State v. Cotton, Nos. SC94996 & SC95281, — So. 2d -, 2000 WL 766521 (Fla. June 15, 2000). Accordingly, for the reásons expressed in Cotton, we answer the certified question in the negative and approve the Third District’s decision regarding the issue posed therein.1

It is so ordered.

WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.

. We do not express an opinion regarding the ex post facto argument addressed by the Third District in its opinion, as that issue has not been raised before this Court.

Dissent
QUINCE, J.,

QUINCE, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, Nos. SC94996 & SC95281, - So. 2d -, 2000 WL 766521 (Fla. June 15, 2000).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Gonzales v. State, 766 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
    …fteen years in state prison in case number 97-332, with a concurrent sixty month term in case number 97-285. Subsequently, this court affirmed the defendant’s judgment and sentence. See Gonzales v. State, 762 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), approved, 763 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 2000). In his motion to withdraw plea, the defendant contends, in pertinent part, that he did not fully understand the consequences of his negotiated guilty plea where “the prosecutor ... improperly sought having the defendant sentenced under…
  • Judge Brandon v. State, 768 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
    …ppellant’s constitutional challenge to the Prison Re-leasee Reoffender Punishment Act, section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997). See State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000); see also Gonzales v. State, 762 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), aff'd, 763 So. 2d 282 (Fla.2000). The second prong of the appellant’s constitutional challenge to his sentence is that his dual sentence as a prison releasee reoffender and a violent career criminal is violative of double jeopardy. We have previously held that such a se…

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