STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROGER LEE BECK, APPELLEE
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The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's downward departure sentence imposed on a defendant who pleaded guilty to felony DUI and driving with a suspended license. The appellate court found that each of the five reasons cited by the trial court for departing from sentencing guidelines was either legally insufficient or unsupported by the record.
The court held that none of the five reasons provided by the trial court justified a downward departure. The plea was not pursuant to a valid plea agreement; substance abuse is statutorily excluded as a mitigating factor; specialized treatment for substance abuse does not justify departure; there was insufficient evidence of cooperation; and unsophisticated manner and remorse are not valid reasons to depart from guidelines in DUI cases.
[1] A trial court errs in departing from sentencing guidelines based on a plea bargain when the plea was not entered pursuant to an agreement between the state and the defend…
[2] Substance abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the offense, is statutorily prohibited as a basis for downward departure from sentencing guidelines.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A defendant's substance abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the offense, is not a mitigating factor under subsection (4) and does not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure from the sentence recommended under the sentencing guidelines.”
Statutory prohibition on using substance abuse as a basis for downward departure, striking down the trial court's second reason.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRoger Lee Beck pleaded guilty to felony driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license. The trial court imposed a downward departure…
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STONE, J.
We reverse Beck’s downward departure sentence entered on his guilty plea to charges of felony driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license. The record supports the state’s position that the trial court’s reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines were either legally insufficient or unsupported by the record.
The trial court listed five reasons for departure: (1) a legitimate, uncoerced plea bargain; (2) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminal nature of his conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; (3) the defendant requires specialized treatment for addiction and is amenable to treatment; (4) the defendant cooperated with the state to resolve the current offense or any other offense; and (5) the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.
As to the first ground, a plea bargain contemplates an “agreement” between the state and the defendant which is approved by the court. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.171. Here, the plea was not entered pursuant to a plea agreement. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to depart from the guidelines on this basis. See also State v. Arvinger, 751 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); State v. McCarthy, 502 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
Next, departing on the basis of impairment is prohibited by section 921.0016(5), Florida Statutes, which provides:
A defendant’s substance abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the offense, is not a mitigating factor under subsection (4) and does not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure from the sentence recommended under the sentencing guidelines.
See also State v. O’Dorle, 738 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); State v. Sanders, 728 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); State v. Brown, 717 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
The third ground for departure was based on Beck’s need for alcohol treatment. Under section 921.0016(4)(d), Florida Statutes, a departure sentence is reasonably justified where the defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is “unrelated to substance abuse or addiction.” As the section specifically excludes treatment for substance abuse or addiction, the trial court erred in departing from the sentencing guidelines on this basis. See also State v. Ford, 739 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).
The fourth ground for departure was that Beck cooperated with the state. There is no indication by the state that Beck should be credited in this regard. Further, we note that the only evidence of cooperation is Beck’s admission of guilt incident to his plea. This is not sufficient cooperation for a departure. See Arvinger, 751 So. 2d at 76; State v. Collins, 482 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
The final ground for departure given by the trial court was that the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner for which the defendant has shown remorse. In State v. Warner, 721 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. granted, 732 So. 2d 328 (Fla.1999), this court recognized that given the state’s strong public policy against DUI, this reason for departure is not valid. We also note that drunk driving cannot be committed in an unsophisticated manner. We have considered, and reject, the contention that the state’s objections were not preserved. Therefore, we reverse the sentence and remand for re-sentencing.
WARNER, C.J. and GLICKSTEIN, HUGH S., Senior Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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State v. VanBEBBER, 848 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 2003)…at section are applicable to all felonies except capital felonies, that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)© is applicable to the felony of driving under the influence (DUI). I would affirm the view espoused by the Fourth District in State v. Beck, 763 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and State v. Warner, 721 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), that the mitigating factor in section 921.0026(2)© is not applicable to DUI convictions. In Beck, the Fourth District reversed a trial court’s downward departure from the…1 / 2
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State v. Clay, 780 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…la. 5th DCA 1999); State v. Norris, 724 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); State v. Brown, 717 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing section 921.0016(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1997); Chapter 97-194, section 41, Laws of Florida); see also State v. Beck, 763 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Since the offense in the instant case occurred after that date, the reason argued to the trial court for departure does not constitute a valid reason for a downward departure sentence. Id. We are aware that a departure sentence…
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State v. VanBEBBER, 805 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…d in this tragic case involving death and. personal injury caused by drunken driving. We affirm but certify conflict with State v. Warner, 721 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), aff'd on other grounds, 762 So. 2d 507 (Fla.2000); see also State v. Beck, 763 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). On May 23, 1999, Paul VanBebber was driving home after a party at which he had consumed sufficient alcohol that his faculties were 'impaired. He failed to stop at a stop sign and collided vfith another vehicle that contained a…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Collins, 482 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
- State v. Warner, 721 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- State v. Arvinger, 751 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Huertas v. Centro Cristiano de Alabanza, Inc., 717 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- State v. Colin Lincoln Ford, 739 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- State v. McCARTHY, 502 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- State v. Sanders, 728 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- State v. O'Dorle, 738 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)