MICHAEL CARTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1999-11-24
No. 99-0427
GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur.
763 So. 2d 1091 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1999) Caution
Cited by 5 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that probation revocation was improper when the condition did not specify a completion date or time limit.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant pleaded no contest to lewd and lascivious assault and was placed on probation with a condition to attend weekly therapy sessions. He complie…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
KLEIN, J.

KLEIN, J.

In 1993, appellant entered a plea of no contest to one count of lewd and lascivious assault and was placed on fifteen years probation. One of the conditions of his probation was that he “must attend weekly sessions with a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist.” The trial court revoked his probation because he violated this condition, and he appeals. We reverse.

In Larangera v. State, 686 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), one of the conditions of probation was that the probationer “continue marital counseling or individual.” The probationer attended counseling for a number of months and then voluntarily stopped. We held that the trial court erred in revoking his probation because the condition did not require completion or contain some other time limit. We concluded that, by attending the sessions which he had attended, he had complied with the condition. We relied on Bingham v. State, 655 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) in which the first district reversed a revocation of probation under similar circumstances.

Appellant apparently complied with the condition for at least three years after his plea, and probably for several years thereafter, as he was not charged with violating it until 1998. We conclude, as we did in Larangera, that because the condition did not require completion or have a time limit, his probation should not have been revoked. Reversed.

GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Rial v. State, 835 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
    …he terms of defendant’s probation did not require that she complete the Passageways program, but only that she enter it, the trial court erred in finding that defendant violated her probation when she absconded from the program. See Carter v. State, 763 So. 2d 1091, (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding probation should not be revoked for failure to complete when a condition of probation does not require completion or have a time limit). See also Bingham v. State, 655 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Defendant satisfie…
  • Ever Nahon Ortiz v. State, 963 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2007)
    …a. 3d DCA 2004), based on alleged express and direct conflict with Bell v. State, 643 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), Bingham v. State, 655 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), Larangera v. State, 686 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), and Carter v. State, 763 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Upon further consideration, we conclude that the Third District’s decision is based on a materially disparate fact as to whether the trial court ordered Ortiz to complete the drug offender treatment program. Additionally, the ci…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw