NEAL EVANS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Neal Evans appeals a trial court's summary denial of his post-conviction motion claiming his guilty plea to second-degree murder was involuntary due to ineffective counsel who allegedly misadvised him about time-served calculations. The appellate court affirms, finding the record conclusively demonstrates the plea was voluntary based on Evans' own sworn statements during the plea colloquy.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief, holding that the record conclusively demonstrates Evans is entitled to no relief on this claim, as Evans' own statements during the plea colloquy directly refute his assertion that the plea was involuntary.
[1] A guilty plea is not rendered involuntary by ineffective assistance of counsel when the defendant affirmatively represents to the court during the plea colloquy that no p…
[2] A defendant's written waiver of rights, which includes a statement that no promises have been made concerning eligibility for early release or the actual amount of time t…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[n]o one, including my lawyer, has made any promise to me concerning my eligi bility for any form of early release authorized by law or the actual amount of time that I will serve under the sentence imposed.”
Language from the waiver of rights form that Evans initialed, directly contradicting his later claim that counsel promised him time reductions.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn February 1997, Neal Evans entered a guilty plea to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 27 years in prison. Evans later filed a post-convictio…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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GROSS, J.
This is an appeal. from a trial court order summarily denying appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
We write.to address one issue raised in appellant’s motion. Appellant entered a guilty plea to second degree murder in February, 1997. He was sentenced to 27 years in prison. One claim in the motion is that the plea was involuntary due to the ineffectiveness of trial counsel, who advised appellant that he would get one third time off of his sentence.
The record conclusively demonstrates that appellant is entitled to no relief on this issue. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(d). First, appellant initialed that portion of the waiver of rights form which indicated that
[n]o one, including my lawyer, has made any promise to me concerning my eligi bility for any form of early release authorized by law or the actual amount of time that I will serve under the sentence imposed.
Second, the court discussed the waiver of rights form with appellant during the plea colloquy. Third, the court questioned appellant concerning the sentence:
The Court: Has anyone promised you anything or induced you in any way to get you to enter this plea—
The Court: — other than what I have set forth in the terms of the negotiated plea?
The Court: Has anyone told you or made any representations to you as to how much time you will actually serve in the Department of Corrections considering your sentence of 27 years?
The Court: Do you understand, sir, that I don’t think there is anybody in this room that can tell you that; I certainly don’t have the slightest idea and it will be completely up to the Department of Corrections. Do you understand that?
Appellant: Yes, sir. The Court: And no one’s made any promises to you as to how much time you will serve on this sentence, is that correct?
Appellant: That’s correct.
It is difficult-to conceive of a record that more conclusively refutes a defendant’s claim that a plea was rendered involuntary because of the bad advice of counsel. The remaining points are without merit.
AFFIRMED.
POLEN and FARMER, JJ., concur.
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Simon v. State, 997 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…in prison stated a sufficient claim and was not refuted by general inquiries in the plea colloquy). This claim may be refuted by specific inquiries made during the plea colloquy or affirmations to the contrary in a signed plea form. Evans v. State, 763 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In its response to this court’s order to show cause, the state argues that this court should affirm because appellant has failed to provide a transcript of the plea colloquy, or the written plea agreement, which is necessary to…
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Ferrari v. State, 861 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…first ground. See Jones v. State, 782 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). The lower court’s remark to the appellant’s aunt, stating the appellant would only serve seventy-five percent of his sentence, distinguishes the instant case from Evans v. State, 763 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), rev. denied, 767 So. 2d 456 (Fla.2000). The order of summary denial is therefore reversed as to the first ground only and remanded for either an evidentiary hearing or the trial court’s attachment of record portions conclusive…