HERMAN SAPP, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Herman Sapp appeals the denial of his motion to suppress cocaine found during a traffic stop based on a BOLO (Be on the Lookout) alert. The court reversed, holding that the BOLO description was too vague to establish reasonable suspicion for the stop, as it matched hundreds of vehicles in the area.
The BOLO was too general and vague to justify the stop. The court reversed the order denying the motion to suppress because the description matched approximately one hundred vehicles in the area, the stop occurred 2.5 to 3.5 hours after the BOLO was issued, and no other suspicious conduct was observed.
[1] An investigatory stop requires a reasonable, well-founded suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal offense.
[2] A "founded suspicion" for an investigatory stop must have a factual basis in the officer's observations, interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in order to justify an investigatory stop of an individual or a car, an officer must have a reasonable, well-founded suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal offense”
Establishes the Fourth Amendment standard required for investigatory stops
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOfficer Fuller received a BOLO describing a newer white four-door vehicle with at least two black males that had been used in a shooting near 701 Nort…
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STEVENSON, J.
This is an appeal from a ruling denying Appellant Herman Sapp’s motion to suppress cocaine discovered as a result of a traffic stop. Appellant argues that the “be on the lookout” (BOLO) which precipitated the traffic stop was not sufficiently specific to create a founded suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle in which he was riding had committed or were about to commit a crime. We agree with Sapp and reverse.
Officer Gerald Fuller of the Ft. Lauder-dale police department received a BOLO over the police radio that someone had fired gunshots from a “newer white, four-door vehicle containing at least two black males” near 701 Northwest 19th Terrace. Fuller eventually stopped a 1998-white, four-door Dodge Neon in which appellant and another black male were riding approximately five blocks from the site of the shooting. Although Officer Fuller testified that he thought he saw the Dodge Neon about “an hour or so” after he heard the BOLO, on cross-examination he admitted that he heard the BOLO around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. but did not stop appellant’s car until 10:35 p.m. Upon effecting the stop, Officer Fuller approached the vehicle and observed two bags of cocaine in plain view in a compartment of the driver’s-side door.
The trial court noted that “it was a very vague description and it’s probably a hundred cars driving around in the street at that time that were white and had two black males in it, but that doesn’t mean that he shouldn’t investigate any of them.” The court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, and he pled nolo contendere, specifically reserving the right to appeal the court’s ruling.
The trial court withheld adjudication and sentenced appellant to eighteen months probation.
An investigatory stop involves Fourth Amendment protections; thus, in order to justify an investigatory stop of an individual or a car, an officer must have a reasonable, well-founded suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal offense. See Williams v. State, 454 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). A “founded suspicion” is a suspicion which has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer, when those circumstances are interpreted in the light of the officer’s knowledge. See Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 248 (Fla.1995); see also Walker v. City of Pompano Beach, 763 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Several factors are relevant in considering a vehicle stop pursuant to a BOLO: the length of time and distance from the offense, route of flight, specificity of the description of the vehicle and its occupants, and the source of the BOLO information. See Sumlin v. State, 433 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Other information which is relevant to detér-mine the validity of the stop includes the time of day, the absence of other persons or vehicles in the vicinity of the sighting, any other suspicious conduct, and other activity consistent with guilt. See Pierre-Louis v. State, 682 So. 2d 669, 670-71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
Reviewing de novo the legal question of whether the facts in this case amount to a reasonable suspicion or probable cause, see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), we must conclude that the BOLO issued in this case was too general to create any legal justification to stop appellant’s car. The BOLO provided no information as to the speed, direction, make or model of the car, the car was stopped some ‘Pk to 3& hours after the BOLO was issued, Officer Fuller did not testify that appellant engaged in any suspicious conduct or activity consistent with guilt, and, as the trial court noted below, there were “probably a hundred cars driving around in the street at that time that were white and had two black males in it.” Accordingly, we reverse the order denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
REVERSED.
KLEIN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
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McMASTER v. State, 780 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…icer, even ’ if for a brief period and limited purpose, constitutes a seizure and invokes Fourth Amendment protections. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla.1986); Sapp v. State, 763 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes, provides that a police officer may reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crim…
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Pantin v. State, 872 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…7 (citing Wong Sun). Pantin contends that the BOLO on which Roiz acted was not specific enough to provide reasonable, well-founded suspicion for conducting an investigatory traffic stop. In support of his contention, Pantin relies on Sapp v. State, 763 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In Sapp, a BOLO for a “ ‘newer white, four-door vehicle containing at least two black males’ near 701 Northwest 19th Terrace” was issued. Id. at 1258. Law enforcement stopped a vehicle matching the description, and containing Sa…
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Kirenia Fuentes v. State, 24 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…arrived on scene, [they] w[ere] only able to corroborate innocent details .... [and] Baptiste was not engaged in any unlawful acts, unusual conduct, or suspicious behavior; he was merely walking down the street.” Id. Furthermore, in Sapp v. State, 763 So. 2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), this court held that an investigatory traffic stop was constitutionally invalid because it was based solely on a “be on the lookout” (“BOLO”) that “was not sufficiently specific to create a founded suspicion that the occup…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (U.S. 1996)
- Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1995)
- Sumlin v. State, 433 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Williams v. State, 454 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Walker v. City OF Pompano Beach, 763 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Pierre-Louis v. State, 682 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)