ROBERT MCKEEVER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert McKeever appealed an order denying his motion for return of property seized by the state in connection with his criminal conviction. The Florida First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred in summarily denying the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the state had a continuing need to retain the property.
The trial court erred in summarily denying McKeever's motion without an evidentiary hearing. Once direct appeal concludes or time for taking direct appeal has run, the trial court cannot rely on unsupported state assertions and must conduct a hearing to determine if the state has a continuing need for the property. The trial court has inherent authority to order return of property seized in criminal proceedings absent proof of the state's further need.
[1] A trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion for the return of property seized in connection with criminal proceedings when the movant alleges the property…
[2] A trial court errs in summarily denying a motion for the return of property without an evidentiary hearing, especially after the criminal case has reached final resolutio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Once direct appeal concludes — or, as here, time for taking a direct appeal has run — the trial court cannot rely on the state's unsupported assertion that it needs to retain private property.”
Establishes that after convictions become final, the state must provide actual proof of need rather than mere assertions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcKeever's convictions became final and he subsequently filed a motion for return of property still in the state's possession. The state opposed the m…
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BENTON, J.
Robert McKeever appeals an order denying in part his motion for return of property in the possession of the state. After Mr. McKeever’s convictions for certain crimes had become final, he filed a motion for the return of his property the state still held, alleging that the property was no longer needed by the state. In its response to the motion, the state contested the return of much of this property on grounds that it would be needed as evidence against Mr. McKeever in the event his convictions were ever overturned. Apparently accepting the state’s allegations, despite the lack of any direct appeal and in the apparent absence of any collateral proceedings, the trial court summarily denied Mr. McKeever’s motion except as to those items the state indicated a willingness to return.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine if the state had a continuing need to retain the property. See Raffone v. Fort Lauderdale Police Dep’t, 731 So. 2d 94, 94 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Calavenzo v. State, 695 So. 2d 857, 857 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
The trial court erred in summarily denying the motion without such a hearing. See Davidson v. State, 751 So. 2d 189, 190 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“[A]ppellant sought return of his property, which was admitted as evidence during his criminal trial.
The trial court summarily denied relief without any explanation for its action. Because the motion was facially sufficient to invoke the criminal court’s authority to effect the return of such property, the trial court erred in summarily denying it.”); McCants v. State, 671 So. 2d 221, 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“The appellant challenges an order by which a motion for the return of property was summarily denied. The appellant alleged that the property was seized in connection with criminal charges, and that the property is no longer needed as evidence since the criminal case has proceeded to a final resolution on appeal. The motion is facially sufficient to invoke the criminal court’s inherent authority to effectuate the return of such property, thus precluding summary denial.”).
Once direct appeal concludes — or, as here, time for taking a direct appeal has run — the trial court cannot rely on the state’s unsupported assertion that it needs to retain private property. See Davidson, 751 So. 2d at 190; McCants, 671 So. 2d at 221.
The trial court has the inherent authority to direct the state to return property seized in connection with criminal proceedings and should do so here absent proof of the state’s further need for the property. See Coon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
BOOTH and WOLF, JJ., CONCUR.
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Eight Hundred, Inc. v. State, 781 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…otion is untimely because the property is considered unclaimed evidence or property seized in a lawful investigation that has vested permanently in a law enforcement agency pursuant to section 705.105, Florida Statutes (1999). See McKeever v. State, 764 So. 2d 688, 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“Once direct appeal concludes — or, as here, time for taking a direct appeal has run — the trial court cannot rely on the state’s unsupported assertion that it needs to retain private property.”); Oleandi; Kern; Stevenson v…
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Matos v. State, 190 So. 3d 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…ime within which defendant could seek postconviction relief had not yet expired). Accordingly, the order summarily denying defendant’s motion for return of property is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. See McKeever v. State, 764 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (reversing an order of summary denial predicated upon State’s assertion that property would be needed as evidence if convictions were ever overturned, where there was no pending direct appeal or collateral proceedings; remanding…
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Webb v. State, 112 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…gency and not in the custody of the court or the clerk of the court. This assumption was in error. A “trial court has the inherent authority to direct the state to return property seized in connection with criminal proceedings.” McKeever v. State, 764 So. 2d 688, 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). This is true regardless of whether the property is in the court’s custody or in the custody of the seizing agency. See, e.g., Stone v. State, 680 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (explaining that if a motion for return of…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Coon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Raffone v. Fort Lauderdale Police Dep't, 731 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Gutierrez v. State, 731 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- McCANTS v. State, 671 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Calavenzo v. State, 695 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Butler v. State, 695 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Parkes v. State, 751 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)