CLIFFORD WALLACE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Clifford Wallace was convicted of unlawfully selling an identification card to an undercover sheriff's deputy at a fake pawn shop. Wallace appealed, challenging the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal and claiming improper jury instructions, but the court affirmed his conviction.
The trial court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal because competent substantial evidence supported the State's case and created an inconsistency with Wallace's defense theories that the jury was entitled to resolve. The jury instruction complaint was barred because Wallace's own trial counsel specifically requested the allegedly erroneous language.
[1] Proof of mental intent is seldom accomplished by direct evidence, and the absence of direct proof on the question of a defendant's mental intent should rarely, if ever, r…
[2] When examining a motion for judgment of acquittal, a trial court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“proof of mental intent is seldom accomplished by direct evidence; consequently, the absence of direct proof on the question of the defendant's mental intent should rarely, if ever, result in a judgment of acquittal”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating circumstantial evidence cases involving intent, supporting rejection of Wallace's motion for acquittal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWallace delivered a torn Florida identification card to an undercover Manatee County Sheriff's deputy at an undercover storefront pawn shop and accept…
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SALCINES, Judge.
Clifford Wallace appeals his conviction for the unlawful sale of an identification card in violation of section 322.212(2), Florida Statutes (1999). We affirm.
The Manatee County Sheriffs Department had established an undercover storefront which appeared to be a pawn shop. Without any discussion, Wallace delivered an identification card to the undercover sheriffs deputy on duty at the pawn shop and accepted $20.00 in exchange. The card had been torn into two pieces. At trial, the deputy testified that he recognized the item to be a Florida identification card, that it had been verified that the card had been issued by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, and that it was “valid.”1
Wallace asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal in this circumstantial evidence case. We note that “[pjroof of mental intent is seldom accomplished by direct evidence; consequently, the absence of direct proof on the question of the defendant’s mental intent should rarely, if ever, result in a judgment of acquittal.” See Ehrlich v. State, 742 So. 2d 447, 450-51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
When examining a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. See State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187, 188-89 (Fla.1989). Only if the State fails to present evidence from which the jury can exclude every reasonable hypothesis, except that of guilt, is it appropriate for the trial court to grant such a motion. See Gordon v. State, 704 So. 2d 107, 112-113 (Fla.1997). The State is not required to rebut conclusively every possible variation of events which could be inferred from the evidence, but only to introduce competent substantial evidence which is inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of events. See Law, 559 So. 2d at 189. If the trial court determines that there is a prima facie inconsistency between the evidence and the defense theory or theories, then the finder of fact must resolve the issue. See Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla.1996).
The trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal “will be reversed on appeal only where unsupported by competent substantial evidence.” Id. In the present case, there was competent substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the State presented adequate evidence refuting Wallace’s theories of innocence. Due to the fact that inconsistency was created between the State and defense theories, the trial court did not err when it denied the motion for judgment of acquittal.
Additionally, Wallace complains that the jury was not properly instructed concerning the offense of sale of an identification card. However, a review of the transcript of the jury instruction conference reveals that the allegedly erroneous language contained within the instructions was specifically requested by Wallace’s own trial counsel. Under these circumstances, any complaint is barred. See e.g., Dukes v. State, 623 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1993).
Affirmed.
BLUE, A.C.J., and CASANUEVA, J., Concur. . The applicable statute defines the term "identification card” to mean any card issued by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles or its agents or any identification card issued by any state or jurisdiction that issues identification cards recognized in this state for the purpose of indicating a person’s true name and age. See § 322.212(1), Fla. Stat. (1999).
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Jones v. State, 790 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…late court must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the state. See, e.g., Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980 (Fla.1999); Lewis v. State, 754 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Wallace v. State, 764 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Nelson v. State, 753 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). This is a correct statement of the standard of review, but it is also the same standard the trial court must apply in ruling on the motion initially. By applying the same standa…
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Jones v. State, 912 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…late court must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the state. See, e.g., Woods v. State, 733 So. 2d 980 (Fla.1999); Lewis v. State, 754 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Wallace v. State, 764 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Nelson v. State, 753 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). This is a correct statement of the standard of review, but it is also the same standard the trial court must apply in ruling on the motion initially. By applying the same standa…
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McFarlane v. State, 239 So. 3d 1272 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…(Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("[A] trial court should rarely, if ever, grant a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the state's failure to prove mental intent." (quoting Hardwick v. State, 630 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994))); Wallace v. State, 764 So. 2d 758, 759 (Fla. 2d ---PAGE 5--- DCA 2000) ("[P]roof of mental intent is seldom accomplished by direct evidence; consequently, the absence of direct proof on the question of the defendant's mental intent should rarely, if ever, result in a judgment of…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Ronnie S. LAW, 559 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1989)
- Orme v. State, 677 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1996)
- Gordon v. State, 704 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1997)
- Misti Ehrlich v. State, 742 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Dukes v. State, 623 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)