B.L.L., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for battery on a school board employee, among other offenses. The appellate court reversed the battery conviction, finding the evidence insufficient because the doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to create the knowledge requirement element of the school employee battery statute, and remanded for separate disposition orders.
The battery on a school board employee charge must be reduced to simple battery because the transferred intent doctrine does not transfer the defendant's knowledge that the victim was a school employee. On remand, the trial court must enter separate disposition orders for each offense rather than a single commitment order.
[1] The doctrine of transferred intent applies only to transfer the defendant's intent as to the intended victim to the unintended victim.
[2] To sustain a charge of battery on a school board employee under section 784.081, Florida Statutes (1997), the evidence must show the defendant knew or had reason to know…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the doctrine only operates to transfer the defendant's intent as to the intended victim to the unintended victim”
Establishes that transferred intent cannot transfer the knowledge requirement element of the school employee battery statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceB.L.L., a child, was involved in an incident at school where he attempted to hit a fellow student but unintentionally struck a school board employee i…
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FULMER, Judge.
The trial court adjudicated B.L.L. delinquent for the offenses of engaging in an affray, disrupting a school function, and battery on a school board employee. B.L.L. argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the charge of battery on a school board employee and that the trial court erred in entering a single commitment order for the three offenses. We find merit to both points and reverse.
We agree with B.L.L.’s assertion that the evidence did not show that B.L.L. had the intent to strike a school employee. Section 784.081, Florida Statutes (1997), reclassifies the offense of simple battery from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree when the victim of the battery is an employee of a school district and “the person committing the offense knows or has reason to know the identity or position or employment of the victim.” At the adjudicatory hearing, all witnesses concurred that B.L.L. was attempting to hit a student and struck the school employee unintentionally. The State argued that the doctrine of transferred intent applied and the trial court relied on that theory to find B.L.L. guilty. This was error because “the doctrine only operates to transfer the defendant’s intent as to the intended victim to the unintended victim.” D.J. v. State, 651 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Applying the doctrine of transferred intent, because B.L.L. intended to hit a fellow student, the trial court could adjudicate B.L.L. of simple battery only.
The single commitment order entered referenced the three charges in this case and a second case involving a violation of community control. B.L.L. argues, and the State agrees, that on remand the trial court should be directed to enter separate disposition orders for each offense. See D.P. v. State, 730 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
Accordingly, we reverse the adjudication for battery on a school board employee and remand for the trial court to reduce that charge to simple battery and to enter separate disposition orders for each offense.
Reversed and remanded.
ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Sagner v. State, 791 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…ed victim). In several cases, our courts have recognized the doctrine of transferred intent in aggravated battery prosecutions but held that it was inapplicable to enhance the severity of the crime against an unintended victim. See B.L.L. v. State, 764 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)(where defendant intended to hit a fellow student and not a school employee, the defendant could only be adjudicated of simple battery); V.M. v. State, 729 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)(doctrine of transferred intent did not opera…
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S.G. v. State, 29 So. 3d 383 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…ictim. Mordica, v. State, 618 So. 2d 301, 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). However, Florida courts have expressly held that the transferred intent doctrine is inapplicable to enhance the severity of a crime against an unintended victim. See B.L.L. v. State, 764 So. 2d 837, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (holding that transferred intent was not applicable when a student intended to strike a fellow student, but instead struck a school employee); D.J. v. State, 651 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (explaining that “only th…
Authorities Cited
- D.J. v. State, 651 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- D.P. v. State, 730 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)