ROBERT SANCHEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Sanchez appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief based on the unconstitutionality of a 1995 statute that amended Florida's habitual offender law. Although the State conceded error, the court affirmed the denial because Sanchez failed to demonstrate that he was actually adversely affected by the unconstitutional statute.
Sanchez is not entitled to postconviction relief because he failed to demonstrate that he was adversely affected by Chapter 95-182. Relief is available only to persons sentenced as habitual violent felony offenders based on the qualifying offense of aggravated stalking during the applicable window period, which did not apply to Sanchez.
[1] A defendant seeking resentencing based on an unconstitutional statute must demonstrate they were adversely affected by the enactment.
[2] A defendant is not adversely affected by an unconstitutional statute if the challenged provisions did not substantively alter their sentence or eligibility for gain time.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“relief may be obtained by "persons who committed their offenses during the applicable window period and were sentenced as habitual violent felony offenders based on the qualifying offense of aggravated stalking."”
Establishes the narrow category of defendants entitled to relief under the single subject challenge; defines the threshold Sanchez failed to meet.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSanchez was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender for offenses committed on December 29, 1996. Chapter 95-182, which amended the habitual of…
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COPE, J.
Robert Sanchez appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Although the State has confessed error, we decline to accept the confession and affirm the order now under review.
Defendant-appellant Sanchez was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender for offenses committed on December 29, 1996. He contends that he was adversely affected by chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, which amended the habitual offender statute. Chapter 95-182 has been held unconstitutional for a violation of Florida’s single subject rule, and defendant’s offense date places him within the window period of persons entitled to raise a single subject challenge. See Johnson v. State, 763 So. 2d 283 (Fla.2000); State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643, 649 (Fla.1999). He argues that he should be resentenced under the laws in effect prior to the enactment of chapter 95-182.
Because defendant has not shown that he was adversely affected by the enact ment of chapter 95-182, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied relief. The Florida Supreme Court has held that relief may be obtained by “persons who committed their offenses during the applicable window period and were sentenced as habitual violent felony offenders based on the qualifying offense of aggravated stalking....” Thompson, 750 So. 2d at 649 (footnote omitted). The defendant makes no claim that he was adjudicated a habitual violent felony offender based on the qualifying offense of aggravated stalking.
The defendant argues, however, that chapter 95-182 reduced the amount of incentive gain time that a habitual violent felony offender was eligible for. That is not true. Chapter 95-182 made an editorial revision in the part of the habitual offender statute which dealt with the earning of gain time by habitual felony offenders and habitual violent felony offenders. There was no substantive change. Compare ch. 95-182, § 2, Laws of Fla., and § 775.084(4)<3)1., Fla. Stat. (1995) (“A defendant sentenced under this section as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender is not eligible for gain-time granted by the Department of Corrections, except that the department may grant up to 25 days of incentive gain-time each month as provided in s. 944.275(4).”), with § 775.084(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1993), (“A defendant sentenced under this section is not eligible for gain-time granted by the Department of Corrections, except that the department may grant up to 25 days of incentive gain-time each month as provided in s. 944.275(4).”).
Defendant also argues that chapter 95-182 imposed a requirement that he serve a minimum of eighty-five percent of his sentence before being released. Again, defendant is mistaken. He cites subparagraph 775.084(4)(j)2., Florida Statutes (1995), but that provision deals with violent career criminals, not habitual felony offenders or habitual violent felony offenders.
It is true that the defendant is subject to the eighty-five percent rule, but that is because of a different law, the Stop Turning Out Prisoners Act. See ch. 95-294, §§ 1, 2, Laws of Fla. (codified as § 944.275(4)(c)2„ Fla. Stat. (1995)). The relevant part of the habitual offender statute incorporates subsection 944.275(4) by reference. See id. § 775.084(4)(j)l., Fla. Stat. (1995); § 775.084(4)(e), Fla. Stat. (1993).
Since the defendant has not shown that he was adversely affected by the unconstitutionality of chapter 95-182, it follows that he is not entitled to be resentenced. See Johnson v. State, 763 So. 2d at 284; Melgares v. State, 762 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (on rehearing).
Affirmed.
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Arthaniel Smith v. State, 768 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Sanchez v. State, 765 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Studnicka v. State, 679 So. 2d 819, 821 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).…
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Rivera v. State, 790 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…ve percent rule, which requires that an inmate serve a minimum of eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed. The Heggs decision did not affect the validity of chapter 95-294. See West v. State, 789 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Sanchez v. State, 765 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). The Department correctly advised the defendant that he is required to serve eighty-five percent of his' sentence. The Department also was correct in rejecting the defendant’s claim that he is entitled to receive twenty days…
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Maltimore Reynolds v. State, 826 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…ntitled to relief because his eight-year sentence falls within the 1994 sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, he is not entitled to be resentenced. See id. at 627. We reject defendant’s arguments regarding gain time on authority of Sanchez v. State, 765 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), Cook v. State, 767 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and Clements v. State, 761 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are facially insufficient or refuted by the record. A…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1999)
- Johnson v. State, 763 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 2000)
- German Melgares v. State, 762 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)