JONATHAN F. IBUR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 2000-08-16
No. 1D00-0208
MINER and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR.
765 So. 2d 275 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed an order of involuntary hospitalization because the hearing officer denied the appellant the fundamental due process right to testify at his commitment hearing. The court held that involuntary commitment constitutes a substantial deprivation of liberty requiring strict adherence to due process protections.


Holding

A patient subject to involuntary commitment cannot be denied the fundamental due process rights to be present, to be represented by counsel, and to be heard. Denial of the right to be heard prior to deprivation of liberty is reversible fundamental error that cannot be considered harmless.


Headnotes

[1] A patient facing involuntary hospitalization has a due process right to be heard.

[2] Denial of the right to be heard in an involuntary commitment proceeding is fundamental error.

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Key Quotes

“involuntary commitment is a substantial deprivation of liberty at which fundamental due process protections must attach, the patient cannot be denied the right to be present, to be represented by counsel, and to be heard”

Establishes the core holding that due process requires the right to testify at involuntary commitment hearings

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Facts & Procedural History

Jonathan F. Ibur was the subject of an involuntary hospitalization proceeding. At the hearing before the officer, Ibur was not permitted to testify. T…

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Opinion of the Court
BARFIELD, C.J.

BARFIELD, C.J.

We find that the hearing officer reversibly erred in not permitting appellant to testify at his hearing for involuntary hospitalization. Because involuntary commitment is a substantial deprivation of liberty at which fundamental due process protections must attach, the patient cannot be denied the right to be present, to be represented by counsel, and to be heard.1 Denial of the due process right to be heard prior to deprivation of one’s liberty is fundamental error which may be raised on appeal even if not preserved below. The error cannot be considered harmless, because the fundamental fairness of the commitment proceeding is called into question.

The order of commitment is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings which accord the appellant due process of law.

MINER and PADOVANO, JJ., CONCUR. . See Chalk v. State 443 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 2d DC A 1984), in which the court held that the due process rights of a patient involuntarily committed to a mental institution were violated when his trial counsel was not allowed to present a closing argument, and that such a patient has a right to closing argument "regardless of the length of the hearing or the apparent simplicity of the issues presented.” See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) ("the function of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions” and "civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection”); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972) ("[tjhose whom the state seeks to involuntarily commit to a mental institution are entitled to the protection of our Constitutions, as are those incarcerated in our correctional institutions”); Shuman v. State, 358 So. 2d 1333 (Fla.1978) (indigents who have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution are entitled to due process and equal protection just as those who are committed to a correctional institution); In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1977) ("[t]he seriousness of the deprivation of liberty and the consequences which follow [an] adjudication of mental illness make imperative strict adherence to the rules of evidence generally applicable to other proceedings in which an individual’s liberty is in jeopardy").


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • DOE v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017)
    …5. “Because involuntary commitment is a substantial deprivation of liberty at which fundamental due process protections must attach, the patient cannot be denied the right to be present, to be represented by counsel, and to be heard.” Ibur v. State, 765 So. 2d 275, 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Individuals subject..to Baker Act commitment hearings are entitled to the strict enforcement of their fundamental due process rights. These rights include: the right to an attorney, the right to testify, present evidence,…
  • Ezekiel Register v. State, 946 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
    …er is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. Furthermore, a denial of the due process right to be present at an involuntary commitment hearing is fundamental error [*51] which may be raised on appeal even if not preserved below. See Ibur v. State, 765 So. 2d 275, 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding that a denial of the due process right to be heard prior to the deprivation of one’s liberty is fundamental error). Because the court below did not certify through proper inquiry that the waiver was knowing, intel…
  • G.T. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 935 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
    …da and United States Constitutions.’ We have also recognized that confinement under the Act implicates an individual’s liberty interest in being free from physical restraint. See Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 104 (Fla.2002).”); Ibur v. State, 765 So. 2d 275, 276 & n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (“Because involuntary commitment is a substantial deprivation of liberty at which fundamental due process protections must attach, the patient cannot be denied the right to be present, to be represented by counsel, an…
    1 / 2

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