WILLIAM COLT PIPPIN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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William Colt Pippin appealed the trial court's denial of his Rule 3.800(a) postconviction motion alleging illegal sentencing due to improper guidelines scoresheet calculations. The appellate court reversed, finding the trial court failed to adequately document that the specific sentencing issues had been previously litigated and denied on the merits.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's denial because the previous denials did not sufficiently document the specific sentencing issues Pippin had previously challenged, nor did the trial court attach record portions to refute his claims. The court found that Pippin's allegation that burglary with a weapon was improperly calculated as level nine instead of level eight met the pleading requirements for Rule 3.800(a) relief.
[1] A motion for postconviction relief alleging errors in the scoring of a guidelines scoresheet, which resulted in an illegal sentence, may be brought under Florida Rule of…
[2] A trial court may deny a motion for postconviction relief based on the law of the case doctrine if the same sentencing issues have been previously raised and denied on th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court's previous denials do not sufficiently set out the sentencing issues Pippin previously challenged, nor does the trial court attach any portion of the record to refute Pippin's claims of an illegal sentence in the instant motion.”
Establishes the inadequacy of the trial court's reliance on law of the case doctrine without proper documentation of the specific issues previously decided.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePippin filed a Rule 3.800(a) motion alleging errors in the scoring of his guidelines scoresheet that resulted in an illegal sentence. He specifically …
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PER CURIAM.
William Colt Pippin appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse.
Pippin filed a rule 3.800(a) motion in the trial court alleging errors in the scoring of his guidelines scoresheet which resulted in an illegal sentence. Appellant alleges that the errors are evident from the face*of the record. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that Pippin had filed previous postconviction motions which raised the same sentencing issues and had been denied on the merits, thereby precluding the rule 3.800(a) motion under the law of the case doctrine. See Nicewonder v. State, 698 So. 2d 376, 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The trial court attached copies of its denials of Pippin’s previous motions.
The trial court’s previous denials do not sufficiently set out the sentencing issues Pippin previously challenged, nor does the trial court attach any portion of the record to refute Pippin’s claims of an illegal sentence in the instant motion. Further, Pippin specifically alleges that he entered a plea with the understanding he would receive a guidelines sentence. The previous denials of Pippin’s requests for relief refer to other scoresheet errors and that appellant entered into a plea agreement. The trial court did not attach any documentation which would indicate the terms of the plea or that these specific claims had previously been raised and denied.
That portion of Pippin’s motion alleging that his guidelines scoresheet demonstrates his primary offense of burglary with a weapon was improperly calculated as a level nine offense instead of a level eight offense meets the pleading requirements of Baker v. State, 714 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Section 921.0012, Florida Statutes, classifies burglary with a weapon as a level eight offense.
We therefore reverse the denial of Pippin’s rule 3.800(a) motion and remand with directions to either grant Pippin’s motion or attach portions of the record which conclusively show that Pippin has previously raised the same issues and has been denied on the merits or which conclusively refute Pippin’s claims of an illegal sentence.
Reversed and remanded.
WOLF, WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Nastri v. State, 775 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…ation, was erroneous. He asserts that once these improperly assessed points are deducted, he falls within a lower’ permitted sentencing range than ninety-six months. These allegations state facially sufficient claims for relief. See Pippin v. State, 765 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(reversing summary denial of rule 3.800(a) motion alleging scoresheet errors even though appellant had entered a plea where he alleged said plea was entered with the understanding he would receive a guidelines sentence); Speer v.…
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Griffis v. State, 819 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…e record reveals that the appellant’s prior motion raising these claims was denied procedurally, and not on the merits. As the trial court’s prior disposition of these issues was procedural, the present motion is not successive. See Pippin v. State, 765 So. 2d 751, 752 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Because the appellant’s claims are apparent on the face of the record, we reverse and remand for the trial court to either address the merits of the appellant’s motion or to refute the appellant’s claims with record attachm…
Authorities Cited
- Williamson v. Penni Lane Williamson, 714 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Baker v. State, 714 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Nicewonder v. State, 698 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)