INTERMEDIARY FINANCE CORPORATION, A CORPORATION UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
DONALD G. MCKAY AND OLIVE MCKAY, HIS WIFE, W. H. SMITH, GEORGE F. MCGLAWN AND LAURA B. MCGLAWN, HIS WIFE, JESSE L. MORRISON AND EUGENIA A. MORRISON, HIS WIFE, AND W. DENVER MARBOURG, APPELLEES
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Intermediary Finance Corporation sued for specific performance of a land sale contract. The court reversed an order allowing W. Denver Marbourg to intervene as a defendant, holding that a party who purchased an interest in the property after a lis pendens was filed and recorded is not entitled to intervene absent special equities.
A purchaser pendente lite (after lis pendens is filed) is not entitled to intervene unless special reasons or equities exist. Marbourg, having acquired his interest months after the lis pendens was filed and recorded, had no right to intervene, and no special equities were shown.
“a purchaser pendente lite is not entitled to intervene”
States the controlling legal doctrine established in prior case law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIntermediary Finance filed suit for specific performance on May 22, 1925, based on a contract dated December 12, 1924. A notice of lis pendens was fil…
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Terrell, J.
Appellant as complainant below brought suit against the appellees, except W. Denver Marbourg, for specific performance of a contract to sell certain lands therein more particularly described. The bill of complaint was filed May 22, 1925, and shows that the contract of sale was entered into December 12, 1924. Notice of lis pendens was filed the same date as the bill of complaint and on January 9, 1926, appellee W. Denver Marbourg filed his petition to intervene on the alleged ground that he had a substantial interest in the property in controversy by virtue of an option to purchase executed by himself and certain other appellees.
January 9, 1926, the Chancellor entered his decree permitting W. Denver Marbourg to intervene and become a party defendant. Appellant promptly appealed from the order permitting Marbourg to intervene, laying five assignments of error, all of which are predicated on the premise that no showing was made sufficient to entitle Marbourg to intervene.
The record discloses that the contract by which Marbourg obtained an alleged substantial interest in the property in controversy was dated August 4, 1925, several months after suit was brought and the notice of lis pendens filed and recorded. This Court is committed to the doctrine that a purchaser pendente lite is not entitled to intervene. Peninsular Naval Stores Co. v. Cox, 57 Fla. 505, 49 South. Rep. 191. See also, Doke v. Williams, 45 Fla. 248, 34 South. Rep. 569; Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234, 78 South. Rep. 14; Hall v. Jack., 32 Md. 253; 21 C. J. 343; 17 R. C. L. 1031.
A lis pendens is literally a pending suit. It has been defined as the jurisdiction, power or control which courts acquire over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until its final judgment therein. The general rule is that whoever purchases the subject matter of a suit pendente lite, takes subject to the decree or judgment. The doctrine of lis pendens is grounded on the theory that the parties to the srrit will not be permitted to withdraw or alienate the subject matter theerof pending litigation. The adoption of any other view would overthrow the whole doctrine. 17 R. C. L. 1009, 1027, and cases cited.
Under our statute (Sec. 2853, Revised General Statutes 1920,) no suit at law or equity operates as a Us pendens till notice thereof has been filed and recorded in the clerk’s office in the county where the propety is situated. As to the effect of the suit and notice we must discern that from the general law on the subject under which and under the rule approved by this court Marbourg is not entitled to intervene.
Appellee Marbourg contends that he is not a mere pur chaser pendente lite, but that there are other and. special reasons and equities in his favor why he should be permitted to intervene. If such special reasons or equities were shown to exist they might be considered; but we have examined the record carefully and they are not made to appear. No fraud is charged, and for all the record discloses he was a man sui juris. He may have made a bad bargin, but under the showing modee a court of equity can give him no relief.
The order permitting Marbourg to intervene was erroneous and is reversed on authorities here cited.
Whitfield, P. J., and Buford, J., concur. Ellis, C. J., and Strum and Brown, J. J., concur in the opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (17 total)
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Greenwald v. Graham, 100 Fla. 818 (Fla. 1930)…are concluded by the decree therein, and it is not necessary that they should be made parties thereto. Such is the general doctrine of lis pendens. ’ ’ Leuders v. Thomas, 35 Fla. 518, 17 So. R. 633, 48 A. S. R. 255; Intermediary Fin. Corp. v. McKay, 93 Fla. 101, 111 So. R. 531. A lis pendens was duly filed in the foreclosure suit here involved, and at the time of the severance of the property from the building it was merged into the final decree, which would include all property in the building considered…
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Switow v. Sher, 136 Fla. 284 (Fla. 1939)…tted that prior to the enactment' oí the 1931 Chancery Act, Acts 1931 c. 14658, this question was answered in the negative by Peninsular Naval Stores Co. v. Cox, et al., 57 Fla. 505, 49 So. 191, and Intermediary Finance Corporation v. McKay, et al., 93 Fla. 101, 111 So. 531; and other cases of similar import, but it is contended by appellee that the rule was modified by the latter act to permit intervention in cases of this kind by the chancellor in his discretion at any time before final decree is entered…
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Andresix Corp. v. Peoples Downtown Nat'l Bank, 419 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…subject of a mortgage foreclosure action and accompanying lis pendens by Peoples Downtown National Bank, was not entitled to intervene in such action. Greenwald v. Graham, 100 Fla. 818, 130 So. 608 (1930); Intermediary Finance Corporation v. McKay, 93 Fla. 101, 111 So. 531 (1927); Peninsular Naval Stores Company v. Cox, 57 Fla. 505, 49 So. 191 (1909). See O’Bryan v. Dr. P. Phillips & Sons, Inc., 123 Fla. 302, 166 So. 820 (1936). Cf. Nelson Bullock Co. v. South Down Development Co., 132 Fla. 495, 181 So. 3…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234 (Fla. 1918)
- Med Rehab Therapy Ctr. Inc. v. Direct Gen. Ins. Co., 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1700 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024)
- The Peninsular Naval Stores Co. v. Cox, 57 Fla. 505 (Fla. 1909)
- Doke v. Williams, 45 Fla. 248 (Fla. 1903)