FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION AND DAVID ERNEST JOHNSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
JERRY COPPOLA AND HIS WIFE, ROSEMARIE COPPOLA, APPELLEES
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The Coppolas sued Johnson and Florida Power Corporation for negligence stemming from a traffic collision. After a jury returned a defense verdict, the trial court ordered a new trial, finding the verdict against the manifest weight of evidence. After a second jury again returned a defense verdict, the trial court again ordered a new trial. The appellate court reversed, holding that two consistent jury verdicts for the defense cannot be set aside as against the manifest weight of evidence.
The court held that a reasonable person would not conclude the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence when two juries have independently reached the same defense verdict. If the jury believed Johnson's testimony, it could reasonably find that Coppola was negligent and solely responsible for the accident, making a defense verdict reasonable as a matter of law.
[1] A trial court should not grant a new trial when a jury's verdict is supported by competent, substantial evidence, even if the judge disagrees with the verdict.
[2] A jury is entitled to believe one version of the facts over another, even if the judge finds that version less credible.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Either we let the jury make this kind of decision or we don't.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that courts must respect jury verdicts when they are supported by credible evidence, even if the judge disagrees with the outcome
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Coppolas were injured in a collision with Johnson, who was driving a Florida Power truck. Mr. Coppola testified he was in the left turn lane, had …
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HARRIS, J.
How many times must a jury return a particular verdict before its decision can withstand a motion for new trial? In this case, we believe the answer is “two” and affirm.
The Coppolas alleged that they were injured in a collision with Johnson, who was driving a Florida Power truck, because of Johnson’s negligence. A jury returned a defense verdict in favor of Johnson and Florida Power. The trial judge, finding that Johnson must have been negligent, found that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordered a new trial. On appeal, we affirmed.
The issue was submitted to a new jury who agreed with the old result, a defense verdict. The trial court was again dissatisfied with the jury result and ordered a new trial. Rather than make this an annual event, we now reverse.
Mr. Coppola testified that he was proceeding in the left turn lane, had been in the left turn lane for some distance, and was driving within the speed limit when Johnson crossed two lanes of traffic to enter the left turn lane in front of him causing the collision. Certainly if one believes this testimony, Johnson was negligent, at least to some degree. On the other hand, Johnson testified that he did proceed through two lanes of traffic to enter the left turn lane but only after the vehicles stopped at the traffic light made room for him and motioned him through. He testified that upon entering the left turn lane, he looked to the left and did not see Coppola. The issue before us now is whether, if the jury believed Johnson and not Coppola (which it is entitled to do), a defense verdict would be against the manifest weight of evidence.
We conclude that if the jury believed Johnson, it could reasonably have found that the drivers of the vehicles who motioned Johnson to cross in front of them would not have done so unless they first determined the left turn lane to be clear. And the jury could have found, based on Johnson’s testimony that he did not see Coppola although he looked in the left turn lane when he was entering it, that Coppola was untruthful in his testimony and that when Coppola came upon a line of vehicles stopped at a traffic light and saw the left turn signal turn green, he accelerated and darted into the left turn lane without an opportunity to see if anyone was in that lane and ran into Johnson. The jury could have found, and did find twice, that the accident was solely the responsibility of Coppola. Either we let the jury make this kind of decision or we don’t.
The granting of the new trial in this case does not pass the Schwartz “gut reaction” test referenced in Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Pope, 532 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), and we hold that a reasonable person would not have concluded that the verdict for appellants was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
We reverse and direct entry of judgment in favor of defendants.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
PLEUS, J., concurs.
COBB, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
COBB, J.,
concurring specially.
Based upon the instant, I concur with the result reached by the majority.
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Howell v. Winkle, 866 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…on Monument Road, not seeing any traffic. The jury could have inferred that Ms. Winkle there [*196] after changed lanes from the stopped left traffic lane into the flowing right curb lane just before the accident. See Florida Power Corp. v. Coppola, 765 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Because the trial court erroneously directed a verdict for Ms. Winkle on the issue of her comparative negligence, a new trial on both liability and damages is required. Home Depot USA Company, Inc. v. Taylor, 676 So. 2d 47…
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BIG Lots Stores, Inc. v. de Diaz, 18 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge (dissenting). After due consideration of the record and the factors I deem pertinent, see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pope, 532 So. 2d 722, 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting); Fla. Power Corp. v. Coppola, 765 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), I believe that this case falls on the “seventh juror,” rather than, as the majority holds, the “judicial discretion” side of the continental divide between the decisions reviewing new trial orders based on the trial judge’s perc…
Authorities Cited
- Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Pope, 532 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)