TRACY CULBERHOUSE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Culberhouse appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging his criminal conviction. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that habeas corpus was an improper procedural vehicle, but clarified that Culberhouse could seek relief through a Rule 3.800 motion if his sentence was imposed under an unconstitutional statute during a specific window period.
A habeas corpus petition is not the appropriate method for challenging a criminal conviction; instead, a defendant must use post-conviction relief procedures. However, a defendant sentenced under an unconstitutional statute during the applicable window period (October 1, 1995 to May 24, 1997) may file a Rule 3.800(a) motion alleging that the sentence could not have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure.
[1] A petition for writ of habeas corpus is an abuse of process when the arguments raised should have been addressed on direct appeal or in a prior motion for post-conviction…
[2] A motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3.800 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure has no time limit.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the proper method for challenging a criminal conviction is a 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief”
Establishes that habeas corpus is not the appropriate procedural vehicle for challenging criminal convictions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCulberhouse was convicted and sentenced under Chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his convictio…
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THOMPSON, C.J.
Tracy Culberhouse appeals the summary denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
In denying his petition, the trial court noted that the proper method for challenging a criminal conviction is a 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. The court construed Culberhouse’s petition as a 3.850 motion and summarily struck it as an abuse of process because Culberhouse had previously filed a 3.850 motion. We affirm the trial court’s order without prejudice because Culberhouse has not shown that a petition for writ of habeas corpus is appropriate. See Leone v. State, 657 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (holding habeas petition was abuse of process where arguments should have been raised on direct appeal or in first 3.850 motion).
In his petition before the trial court, Culberhouse also argued that the trial court had sentenced him pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. He alleged that Chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida was unconstitutional because it violated “the single subject requirement and/or rule contained in ... Art. Ill section 6, of the Florida Constitution.” The trial’ court wrote that the issue was pending before the Florida Supreme Court based upon the Second District’s holding in Heggs v. State, 718 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The trial court concluded that Culberhouse could “file a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3.800 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is no time limit on such a motion.”
In Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida, was unconstitutional because it violated the single subject provision of the Florida Constitution. In Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla.2000) the court held that a defendant could seek relief from an illegal sentence imposed under the sentencing guidelines of Chapter 95-184 by filing a motion pursuant to Rule 3.800(a) alleging that the crime for. which the sentence was received falls within the window period. The court wrote that the window period opened on October 1, 1995, when the amended guidelines became effective, and closed on May 24, 1997, when Chapter 97-97, Laws of Florida, reenacted the amendments contained in Chapter 95-184.
Culberhouse can file a motion for collateral relief pursuant to Rule 3.800. In his motion, he must allege he falls within the window period, and that his sentence could not have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order, but without prejudice to Culber-house’s filing a facially sufficient rule 3.800(a) motion.
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Xzavier Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000)
- Heggs v. State, 718 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)
- Natoel v. Royal Caribbean Cruise, Ltd., 657 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Leone v. State, 657 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)