STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
A.M., APPELLEE
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The State appealed a trial court's dismissal of a delinquency petition charging A.M. with exhibiting a weapon on school grounds. The appellate court reversed, holding that the October 1997 amendment to Florida's statute prohibiting weapon exhibition on school grounds expanded the definition to include any knife, even common pocketknives, contrary to the trial court's reliance on the prior statutory exemption.
The court held that pursuant to the October 1997 amendment to section 790.115, any knife, including a common pocketknife, is prohibited from being exhibited on school grounds. The trial court erred in dismissing the petition based on the outdated statutory exemption for pocketknives.
[1] A "knife" is prohibited from being exhibited on school grounds under section 790.115(1), Florida Statutes, as amended in 1997.
[2] The statutory definition of "weapon" in section 790.001(13), Florida Statutes, which may exclude common pocketknives, is not applicable to the prohibition against exhibit…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 790.115(1), Florida Statutes (1997), prohibits the exhibition of "any sword, sword cane, firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon, including a razor blade, box cutter, or knife ... in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner" on school grounds.”
Establishes the statutory provision at issue and shows that the statute explicitly includes knives in the prohibited items.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA.M. was charged with exhibition of a weapon on school grounds under section 790.115(1). The weapon in question was determined to be a common pocketkn…
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FULMER, Judge.
The State appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing a delinquency petition that charged A.M. with exhibition of a weapon on school grounds. We reverse the dismissal and remand for further proceedings.
Section 790.115(1), Florida Statutes (1997), prohibits the exhibition of “any sword, sword cane, firearm, electric weapon or device, destructive device, or other weapon, including a razor blade, box cutter, or knife ... in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner” on school grounds. The allegation against A.M. in the delinquency petition tracked this statutory language. A.M. moved to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), asserting, among other things, that the weapon in question was a common pocketknife. After a hearing in which the trial court concluded that the weapon was a common pocketknife, and therefore excluded from the statutory definition of “weapon” pursuant to section 790.001(13), Florida Statutes (1997), the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, relying on L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370 (Fla.1997).
The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition because the statutory definition of weapon found in section 790.001(13) is not applicable in this case. It asserts that the reference to pocketknives found in that section, and discussed in L.B., no longer applies to exempt pocketknives from section 790.115(1) because the legislature amended section 790.115 effective October 1, 1997, to expand the definition of prohibited items, and to specifically prohibit any “knife” from being exhibited on school grounds.
Wé agree with the State that pursuant to the October 1997 amendment to section 790.115,1 any “knife,” which we read to include even a “common pocketknife,” is prohibited on school grounds. See A.B. v. State, 757 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); C.A.J. v. State, 732 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (Dauksch, J., concurring). Because this statute was in effect at the time of the offense, the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, we reverse the order granting the motion to dismiss and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and STRINGER, J., Concur. . Ch. 97-234, Laws of Fla.
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Bunkley v. State, 833 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 2002)…sole reported appellate decision discussing the retroactivity of L.B. . Subsequent to L.B., the Legislature amended section 790.115, Florida Statutes, to specifically prohibit any “knife'' from being exhibited on school grounds. See State v. A.M., 765 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). This legislation does not alter the definition of weapon in section 790.001(13) or the incorporation of that definition into the armed burglary provision under which Bunkley was convicted.…
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Metcalfe v. Spencer LEE, M.D. & Mark A. Pinsky, M.D., P.A., 952 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…edure according to their plain meaning). In addition, a court may refer to a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning. See L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla.1997), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. AM., 765 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Williams v. State, 378 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (declaring “the word ‘shall’ as used by the Supreme Court when establishing rules of court procedure means exactly what it usually means and as defined in an accepted dic…
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Brenton McNeil v. State, 215 So. 3d 55 (Fla. 2017)…v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1997) (“[A] court may refer to a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning which the [L]egislature intended to ascribe to the term.”) superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. A.M., 765 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The word “a” is typically “used as a function word before most singular nouns” and is defined as “one,” or “any, each.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1 (1993). The word “any” is defined as “one, no matter what one:…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1997)
- A.B. v. State, 757 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- C.A.J. v. State, 732 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Bostrom v. State, 732 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)