FULTON T. PERKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of a habeas corpus petition, agreeing with the State that administrative remedies were not applicable to challenging a detainer.
The appellate court held that the trial court erred in denying the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the State conceded that no administrative remedy existed for challenging a detainer.
[1] A petition for habeas corpus must be filed in the county where the defendant is detained at the time of filing, and a subsequent transfer of the defendant does not divest…
[2] A prisoner seeking only the removal of a detainer, rather than immediate release, may have an adequate remedy in a writ of mandamus.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFulton Perkins filed a habeas corpus petition challenging a felony detainer that he alleged improperly influenced his parole revocation. The trial cou…
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GRIFFIN, J.
Fulton T. Perkins appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus.
Perkins was incarcerated at Lake Correctional Institution in Lake County, Florida when he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Lake County circuit court (the Fifth Judicial Circuit). The petition was based on the following allegations. Perkins had been charged in Seminole County, Florida (the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit) with first-degree murder and had served approximately twenty years in prison for the offense before being released on parole on April 22, 1992. After his release, Perkins was charged in Orange County, Florida (the Ninth Judicial Circuit) with aggravated stalking and battery. He was convicted only of the lesser included offense of stalking, a first-degree misdemeanor, and was sentenced to 188 days in the county jail, to be served “consecutive to any other sentence,” with a credit for 127 days served. After he was sentenced for the stalking offense, Perkins was brought before the parole revocation board, which on April 15, 1994, remanded him to the custody of the DOC for a parole violation and transferred him to Central Florida Reception Center. At the time of the transfer, Perkins had 53 days remaining to be served for the stalking offense. Perkins’ presumptive release date for the first-degree murder is August 2, 2008.
Subsequent to his transfer, Perkins allegedly learned that a felony detainer had been filed against him with respect to the Orange County charges for “CR93-12160 for aggravated stalking and aggravated battery.” Perkins appears to be complaining that the invalid detainer influenced the decision to revoke his probation, and resulted in a decision to delay review of his consideration for parole.
The court denied Perkins’ petition because of his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Perkins filed a motion for rehearing and/or clarification in which he argued that the DOC was without jurisdiction or authority to alter or recall a detainer and therefore he was not required to request relief from the DOC regarding the detainer. In the motion, Perkins stat ed that he was not seeking to overturn his sentence for stalking via the proceedings before the court, although his sentence for the stalking offense may well have expired. He maintained that he was challenging only the detainer. The motion for rehearing was denied.
On appeal, Perkins contends that the trial court erred by denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus on the basis of his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. The State of Florida (which has responded to the petition) concedes this issue, agreeing with Perkins that there is “no DOC remedy for an improper detainer.”
However, the State maintains that it would be pointless to remand this case for a determination on the merits, since Perkins has been transferred to Avon Park Correctional Institution, which is in Polk County, in the Tenth Judicial Circuit. See Alday v. Singletary, 719 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). It argues that Perkins’ incarceration in Polk County deprives the Lake County circuit court of jurisdiction to consider the petition and that a remand would essentially be “moot.”'
The State’s argument is technically incorrect. Although a petition for habeas corpus must be filed with the clerk of the court in the county where the defendant is detained, § 79.09, Fla. Stat. (1997), Raley v. State, 675 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 5th DCA), cause dismissed, 678 So. 2d 1287, and appeal dismissed, 683 So. 2d 484 (Fla.1996), the requirement was met in this case. Perkins filed his petition in Lake County when he was incarcerated in Lake County. His subsequent transfer does not destroy Lake County’s jurisdiction, since jurisdiction is determined as of the filing of the petition. See, e.g., Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 193, 68 S.Ct. 1443, 92 L.Ed. 1898 (1948); Francis v. Rison, 894 F. 2d 353, 354 (9th Cir.1990); Santillanes v. United States Parole Comm’n, 754 F. 2d 887, 888 (10th Cir.1985); Ross v. Mebane, 536 F. 2d 1199, 1201 (7th Cir.1976).
Nonetheless, Perkins appears to have sought the wrong remedy. Perkins is seeking the removal of a detainer, which is “a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985). Since Perkins has not alleged that he is entitled to immediate release, but only to removal of the detainer, his remedy, if any is proper, would appear to be mandamus, requiring whoever lodged the detainer (apparently the Sheriff of Orange County) to remove it. His petition for mandamus, however, would have to be filed in the circuit court having jurisdiction over the person who had lodged the detainer. See State v. Parks, 94 Fla. 91, 113 So. 702 (1927) (mandamus must be filed where official performs act complained of). In this case, this is Orange County. Accordingly, we reverse the appealed order with instructions to transfer the cause to Orange County.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
THOMPSON, C.J., and PLEUS, J., concur.
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Collins v. State, 859 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…tion to physically produce the petitioner.” T.O., 684 So. 2d at 816 (citations omitted). Hence, the general rule is that the circuit court where the defendant is incarcerated has jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus. T.O.; Perkins v. State, 766 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“Although a petition for habeas corpus must be filed with the clerk of the court in the county where the defendant is detained, the requirement was met in this case.”) (citations omitted); Torres v. State, 700 So. 2d 1247…
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Jenkins v. State, 957 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)…and requested the lower court to order the Department of Corrections to remove the detain-er. Jenkins failed to name the appropriate respondent, which would be the Volusia County Sheriffs Office because it lodged the detainer. See Perkins v. State, 766 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that mandamus is proper remedy to re [*23] quire whoever lodged detainer to remove it). Nevertheless, Jenkins’ complaint alleged that the Volusia County Sheriffs Office lodged the detainer. Thus, the lower court had a su…
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Gibson v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 895 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…right, 423 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). We reverse the order dismissing the petition because the trial court should have treated the petition as a petition for writ of mandamus and transferred the case to Leon County. See Perkins v. State, 766 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.; see also Hunt v. State, 798 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). The law governing review of the Commission’s decisions is arcane and' often confusing. Here, the petition was mislabeled and filed in the w…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (U.S. 1948)
- Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (U.S. 1985)
- Raley v. State, 675 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Robert H. Anderson v. Parks, 94 Fla. 91 (Fla. 1927)
- Glade Corr. Inst. v. Brownell, 719 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)
- Santillanes v. United States Parole Comm'n & Bureau of Prisons, 754 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1985)
- Ross v. Mebane, 536 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1976)
- Rondal R. Francis v. R.H. Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1990)