URO-CARE, P.A., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND URO-MEDIX, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANTS,
v.
BARBARA MONTFORD, M.D., APPELLEE
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Uro-Care and Uro-Medix sought a preliminary injunction to enforce a non-compete agreement against their former employee, Dr. Montford. The trial court denied the injunction based on 'patient preference,' but the appellate court reversed, finding this rationale did not constitute the statutory 'public health, safety and welfare' exception and remanded for consideration of appellee's other arguments.
The trial court's denial was reversed and remanded because 'patient preference' does not satisfy the statutory 'public health, safety, and welfare' exception. On remand, the trial court must rule on each of the other grounds raised by appellee in opposition to the preliminary injunction motion.
[1] A trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction based on a single ground, when other grounds were presented and not addressed, warrants reversal and remand.
[2] On remand, a trial court must consider all grounds raised in opposition to a motion for preliminary injunction if the initial denial was based on an insufficient or unadd…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“enforcement of the covenant was contrary to 'the public health, safety and welfare.' § 542.335(f), Fla. Stat. (1997). However, the record reflects that the sole ground cited by the trial court for denying the preliminary injunction relates to 'patient preference' rather than 'the public health, safety, and welfare.'”
Establishes that the trial court's stated legal ground differed from its actual reasoning, which was insufficient.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDr. Barbara Montford signed a covenant-not-to-compete when beginning employment with Uro-Care and Uro-Medix. After leaving employment, her former empl…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants, former employers of appel-lee, a medical doctor, sought a preliminary injunction to enforce a covenant-not-to-compete which appellee signed when she began working for appellants. During the hearing on appellants’ Motion for Temporary Injunction, the appellee raised several issues in an effort to have the motion denied. In denying appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction, the trial court only cited one of the grounds argued by the appellee, to-wit: enforcement of the covenant was contrary to “the public health, safety and welfare.” § 542.335(f), Fla. Stat. (1997).
However, the record reflects that the sole ground cited by the trial court for denying the preliminary injunction relates to “patient preference” rather than “the public health, safety, and welfare.” Cf. Lloyd Damsey, M.D., P.A. v. Mankowitz, 339 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 421 (Fla.1977)(finding that the covenant would jeopardize the public health of the community where the testimony presented revealed a compelling need for the employee’s services as a surgeon in the area).
Accordingly, the Order under review must be reversed, with this cause being remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
On remand, the trial court should rule on each of the other grounds raised by the appellee in opposition to appellants’ motion for preliminary injunction. See Harrison v. Palm Harbor MRI, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
If the trial court determines that any of those grounds support denial of appellants’ motion, then the trial court shall enter an Order accordingly. If, on the other hand, the trial court finds that none of the other arguments presented by the appellee would support a denial of appellants’ motion, the trial court would be obligated to grant the motion and enter the injunction sought by appellants. Naturally, nothing herein should be construed as preventing the trial court from holding such further hearings as the court might deem necessary in accomplishing the foregoing.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
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Citator
Cited By
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Uro-Care, P.A. v. Barbara Montford, M.D., 775 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…PER CURIAM. After the reconsideration required by our opinion in Uro-Care v. Montford, 767 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), the trial judge again denied Uro-Care’s application for a temporary injunction enforcing the terms of a non-competitive agreement with Dr. Montford. On this second appeal, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denyi…
Authorities Cited
- Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Harrison v. Palm Harbor MRI, Inc., 703 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Lloyd Damsey, M.D., P.A. v. Barry J. Mankowitz, M.D., 339 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)