STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM COOKE, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the dismissal of charges against William Cooke for driving with a revoked license as a habitual traffic offender. The trial court dismissed the information on double jeopardy grounds after Cooke was acquitted of a related charge. The appellate court reversed, holding that the two offenses are distinct under the Blockburger test because each requires proof of an element the other does not.
The court reversed the dismissal, holding that the two offenses are separate and distinct under the Blockburger test, and therefore double jeopardy does not bar the subsequent prosecution under section 322.34(5). The offenses contain different elements: knowledge of license suspension/revocation is required for section 322.34(2)(c) but not section 322.34(5), while proof of habitual traffic offender status is required for section 322.34(5) but not section 322.34(2)(c).
[1] Prosecution for driving with a revoked license as a habitual traffic offender is not barred by double jeopardy when the defendant was previously acquitted of driving with…
[2] Under the Blockburger "same-elements" test, offenses are considered separate for double jeopardy purposes if each requires proof of an element that the other does not.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“offenses are separate if each offense, requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.”
Statement of the Blockburger test as codified in Florida statute, the standard for determining whether successive prosecutions violate double jeopardy.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliam Cooke was charged with driving while his license was revoked as a habitual traffic offender under section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes. Prior t…
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[*469] PER CURIAM.
The state appeals from the dismissal of the information filed against William Cooke for driving while his license was revoked as a habitual traffic offender under section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (1997).1 The information was dismissed on double jeopardy grounds. Cooke had previously been acquitted of driving while his license was suspended under section 322.34(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1997).2 Cooke’s motion for judgment of acquittal was granted based upon his argument that he was a habitual traffic offender and section 322.34(2)(c) specifically prohibits persons who have been declared habitual traffic offenders under section 322.264, Florida Statutes (1997), from prosecution under that section. We reverse.
In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the Supreme Court set forth the “same-elements” test which inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other. If they do not, then they are the same offense and subsequent prosecution is barred. The Blockburger test has been codified in Florida at section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1997). Section 775.021(4) provides, in pertinent part, that “offenses are separate if each offense, requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.”
Knowledge on the part of the defendant that his driver’s license was revoked must be proven under section 322.34(2)(c) and not under section 322.34(5). Revocation of a defendant’s driver’s license as a habitual traffic offender must be proven under section 322.34(5) but not under section 322.34(2)(c). Therefore, these offenses are separate and double jeopardy does not bar this subsequent prosecution. We reverse the dismissal of the information and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED.
FARMER, KLEIN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. . (5) Any person whose driver’s license has been revoked pursuant to § 322.264 (habitual offender) and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
. (2) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in § 322.264, who, knowing of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation, drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon:
(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree....
PER CURIAM.
In his motion for rehearing, William Cooke presents to this court his answer brief that, through the error of his counsel, was not timely filed and was not considered by this court in making its decision. We have considered that brief just as if it was timely filed. We remain of the opinion that the information should not have been dismissed and adhere to our original opinion. We deny Cooke’s motion for rehearing.
FARMER, KLEIN and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Hagood v. State, 824 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…e had been given to Hagood before he drove the vehicle. While knowledge of revocation is a necessary element of section 322.34(2), which specifically excludes habitual offenders like Hagood, it is not required for subsection (5). See State v. Cooke, 767 So. 2d 468, 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). This distinction is not controlling, however, as we, instead, focus on the similarities. Both offenses are subsumed by the offense of driving without a valid license. In other words, a person cannot commit the latter witho…
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Simmons v. State, 824 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…ppellant was convicted under section 5 of the 2001 statute, the appellant is not entitled to relief because that section does not contain a knowledge requirement. See Brown v. State, 764 [*328] So. 2d 741, 743-44 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); State v. Cooke, 767 So. 2d 468, 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). However, since the trial court did not attach any records showing which statute the appellant was charged and convicted under, it is impossible to determine whether his claim has merit. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(d) (2002).…
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Duff v. State, 942 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…Blockburger and section 775.021(4)(a) require courts to first examine whether “each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not....” This step is referred to as the “same elements” test. Paul, 934 So. 2d at 1173. In State v. Cooke, 767 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), the Fourth District applied the same elements test to the same two crimes involved in the instant case and concluded that the offenses were separate. Specifically, driving while license suspended requires proof the defendant kne…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932)