DONNA ROBERT AND JOHN ROBERT, ETC., APPELLANTS,
v.
HOMER A. PASCHALL, M.D., ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 5th DCA | 2000-07-28
No. 5D99-3100
DAUKSCH and SAWAYA, JJ., concur.
767 So. 2d 1227 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2000) Negative Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

The Roberts sued for medical malpractice after Donna Robert was treated by Dr. Paschall, who had hospital staff privileges but no medical malpractice insurance required by Florida law. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of claims against Putnam Community Medical Center, holding that hospitals have a statutory duty under Florida's Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act to ensure staff physicians maintain required financial responsibility coverage.


Holding

Hospitals have a statutory duty under section 458.320(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes to assure the financial responsibility of staff-privileged physicians. A cause of action against a hospital arises only after establishing the physician's liability for medical malpractice and the physician's inability to satisfy the judgment, with the hospital's liability capped at $250,000. The trial court erred in dismissing with prejudice and should have dismissed without prejudice.


Headnotes

[1] A hospital has a statutory duty to assure the financial responsibility of its staff-privileged physicians who use the hospital for medical treatment and procedures.

[2] A hospital's statutory duty to ensure physician financial responsibility is separate from its common law duty to select and retain professionally competent staff physicia…

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Key Quotes

“Financial responsibility is a statutorily-mandated condition of a physician's ability to maintain staff privileges at a hospital.”

Establishes that Florida law imposes a mandatory financial responsibility requirement as a prerequisite for staff privileges.

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Facts & Procedural History

Donna Robert fractured her humerus and sought treatment at Putnam Community Medical Center, where she was referred to Dr. Homer Paschall, who had staf…

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Opinion of the Court
PLEUS, J.

PLEUS, J.

Donna and John Robert allege that Donna went to Putnam Community Medical Center (“Putnam”) for treatment after fracturing her humerus. At Putnam, she was referred to Dr. Homer Paschall, a doctor with staff privileges but no medical malpractice insurance. Four days later, Dr. Paschall operated on Donna at the hospital. In-the ensuing lawsuit, the Roberts alleged medical malpractice against Dr. Paschall. They also joined Putnam. The counts against Putnam that were dismissed with prejudice are the subject of this appeal. We reverse.

The Roberts claim that Putnam was negligent because it granted staff privileges to Dr. Paschall knowing he had no medical malpractice insurance and was otherwise not financially responsible under Florida’s mandatory financial responsibility law. In short, they allege Dr. Paschall was “bare.” Financial responsibility is a statutorily-mandated condition of a physician’s ability to maintain staff privileges at a hospital. § 458.320(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997).

The trial court dismissed the action with prejudice on the authority of Beam v. University Hospital Bldg., Inc., 486 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), a case which rejected the theory that a hospital could be liable for its negligent employment of a financially incompetent physician. The holding in Beam was simply that hospitals have no common law obligation to assure their staff physicians are financially responsible. Even though Beam was decided after the effective date of the Comprehensive Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985, Beam does not cite the Reform Act.

The pertinent portion of the Reform Act, section 458.320(2)(b), requires a physician, as a condition of having staff privileges, to maintain professional liability coverage of not less than $250,000 per claim or provide an escrow account or letter of credit in a similar amount. The obvious intent of the legislature was to make sure that a person injured by the medical malpractice of a doctor with staff privileges would be able to ultimately recover at least $250,000 of compensable damages. We read section 458.320(2)(b) as imposing a statutory duty on the hospital to assure the financial responsibility of its staff-privileged physicians who use the hospital for medical treatment and procedures.

This statutory duty is separate and distinct from the common law duty imposed on hospitals to select and retain professionally competent staff physicians. See Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla.1989). The theory of liability discussed in Insinga is what has come to be called the corporate negligence doctrine. Insinga recognized that a hospital is the “only entity that can realistically provide quality control” because it is “in a superior position to supervise and monitor physician performance.” Id. at 214.

The Roberts and the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers argue that a doctor who enjoys staff privileges while “bare” is “incompetent,” and that Insinga therefore applies. We do not believe that compliance with the state’s mandatory financial responsibility law has anything to do with the professional competency of the doctor although we recognize that some doctors may be unable to obtain coverage because of past malpractice.

In holding that the trial court erred in dismissing with prejudice the Roberts’ claims against the hospital, we feel compelled to address another issue this case raises, to wit: the question of when the cause of action arises against the hospital. We conclude that the cause of action against the hospital does not arise or accrue until the insured party can establish that the staff-privileged physician is liable to him or her for medical malpractice. After the cause of action accrues, it will then be necessary to establish, by appropriate evidence, what portion of the judgment the doctor cannot satisfy. The limit of the hospital’s liability in any event is $250,000.

We believe this holding is compatible with the legislative intent to make sure that plaintiffs, such as the Roberts, are compensated, assuming they are so entitled, at least up to $250,000. Credit must be given to any amount collected by the Roberts on any judgment obtained against Dr. Paschall.

Thus, a dismissal without prejudice, rather than with prejudice, in favor of Putnam is appropriate upon remand. The Roberts may re-file a complaint against Putnam at the appropriate time.

REVERSED.

DAUKSCH and SAWAYA, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Horowitz v. Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 959 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2007)
    …District Court of Appeal held that there was no indication of legislative intent to impose civil liability on hospitals anywhere in the statutory scheme. See id. at 488. This decision expressly and [*178] directly conflicts with Robert v. Paschall, 767 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), Baker v. Tenet Healthsystem Hospitals, Inc., 780 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), and Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Baumgardner, 870 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), all of which recognized a statutory cause of action based on section 458…
  • Baker v. Tenet Healthsystem Hosps. Inc., 780 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
    …staff privileges at a hospital. This section likewise imposes a statutory duty on a hospital to assure the financial responsibility of its staff-privileged physicians who use the hospital for medical treatment and procedures. See Robert v. Paschall, 767 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. [*172] 5th DCA 2000).1 Thus, count XI does state a cause of action against the hospital under section 458.320(2)(b). However, the cause of action will not accrue until the Bakers establish liability on the part of the staff physicians, and the…
  • Plantation Gen. Hosp. Ltd. P'ship v. Horowitz, 895 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …lso points out that, in presenting the motion for summary judgment, the issue had been narrowed as a result of the stipulation of the parties as to the operative facts. The parties had reduced the issue to whether the holdings in Robert v. Paschall, 767 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), and Baker v. Tenet Healthsystem Hospitals Inc., 780 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), would apply to this case, where the underlying malpractice occurred in the physician’s office rather than the hospital. In response to the motion…
    1 / 2

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