ROBERT JAMES KISNER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 2000-06-16
No. 5D99-2605
Peterson, J., Dauksch, J., Harris, J.
768 So. 2d 1107 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (2000) Caution
Cited by 28 cases

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Synopsis

Affirmed conviction under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act for lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, certifying the separation of powers constitutional challenge to the Florida Supreme Court.


Holding

The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate separation of powers principles, and the court affirms the conviction while certifying the constitutional issue to the Florida Supreme Court.


Headnotes

[1] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate the separation of powers doctrine under the Florida Constitution.

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Facts & Procedural History

Kisner was convicted under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act for committing a lewd and lascivious or indecent act upon a child.…

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Opinion of the Court
PETERSON, J.

PETERSON, J.

Robert James Kisner appeals the judgment and sentence he received under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act for committing a Lewd and Lascivious or Indecent Act Upon a Child. Kisner first argues that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (section 775.082(8), Florida Statutes (1997)) is unconstitutional based on a separation of powers defect. We affirm on the separation of powers argument based on Speed v. State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, 743 So. 2d 15 (1999). But, we certify the issue to the Florida Supreme Court as we did in Richardson v. State, 748 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), review granted, 751 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Jan.6, 2000); Robinson v. State, 742 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), review granted, Table No. SC96976, 761 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Feb. 21, 2000); Moon v. State, 737 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), review granted, 751 So. 2d 1253 (Fla.2000); Cook v. State, 737 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), review granted, Table No. SC96399, 761 So. 2d 327 (Fla. Feb 21, 2000).

Kisner’s second argument is that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is unconstitutional because it denies due process of law. This argument was raised, sua sponte, by this Court in Speed, 732 So. 2d at 19 n. 4. While this argument has been raised by Kisner, it has not been briefed in the instant appeal. We, therefore, do not consider its validity or viability.

DAUKSCH and HARRIS, JJ„ concur.

Other
PETERSON, J.

PETERSON, J.

We grant the State of Florida’s motion for rehearing in which it requests that we reconsider our opinion that certified the issue of the constitutionality of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. The Florida Supreme Court has since upheld the constitutionality of the Act. See Cotton v. State, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000).

We therefore affirm Kisner’s judgment and sentence.

MOTION GRANTED; JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

HARRIS and PLEUS, JJ., concur.


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  • …ctively and is inapplicable to this case.6 NEW TRIAL/ADDITUR ISSUE The trial court’s determination regarding additur may be reversed on appeal only where there is a clear abuse of discretion. Arena Parking, Inc. v. Lon Worth Crow Insurance Agency, 768 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). If an appellate court determines that reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. Brown v. Estate of Stuckey, 749 So. 2d 490 (Fla.…
  • Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 133 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)
    …a result of the opposing party’s failure to admit requests for admissions may not be assessed against the opposing party for denying a request to admit a hotly-contested, central issue to the case.” Arena Parking, Inc. v. Lon Worth Crow Ins. Agency, 768 So. 2d 1107, 1113 (Fla. 3d [*1024] DCA 2000). If the result were otherwise, then “where a party denies a request to admit a fact which is the central issue of fact in the case, prevailing party attorney’s fees would become the rule, rather than the exception.”…
  • Haas Automation, Inc. v. FOX, 243 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
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