W.L., APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2000-10-18
No. 3D00-93
Before JORGENSON, COPE, and GODERICH, JJ.
769 So. 2d 1132 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 11 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The court reversed a juvenile delinquency adjudication for disorderly conduct where the appellant was arrested solely for yelling profanities at police during a narcotics investigation. The court held that pure speech, even offensive and profane speech, is protected by the First Amendment and cannot serve as the basis for a disorderly conduct conviction absent conduct that incites a breach of the peace.


Holding

The court held that the appellant's conduct was pure speech protected by the First Amendment and reversed the adjudication of delinquency. The court concluded that punishing an individual solely for asserting the right to free speech in an offensive manner violates the Constitution.


Headnotes

[1] Profane and offensive speech, without more, does not constitute disorderly conduct sufficient to justify an arrest.

[2] The First Amendment protects an individual's right to verbally oppose or challenge police action without risking arrest.

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Key Quotes

“Respondent was "punished simply for asserting his right to free speech in what the police considered — and what may well have been — an offensive manner. But the constitution does not permit that result."”

Establishes the core principle that the Constitution prohibits punishment for offensive speech without incitement to breach of peace.

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Facts & Procedural History

Miami-Dade police officers conducting a narcotics investigation approached a group of 15-20 people. The appellant, a juvenile standing in the group wi…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals from an adjudication of delinquency and a sentence of com munity control. For the following reasons, we reverse.

Miami-Dade police officers were conducting a narcotics investigation when they encountered a group of 15-20 people within a 10-15 foot area. Respondent was standing in the group with four other juveniles, and was not doing anything unlawful. The officers approached W.L. and demanded identification (name and date of birth) to fill out a field card. W.L. did not try to flee; he did yell out a series of profanities at the police.

Nothing was thrown at the officers; no member of the crowd threatened the officers. Although the officers testified that they feared for their safety, they did not call for backup. The officers arrested W.L. for disorderly conduct.

At his hearing, W.L. argued that his words alone were protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. He argued that although the words were admittedly profane and offensive, they did not incite a breach of the peace. Respondent moved twice for a judgment of acquittal on these grounds; both times the court denied his motion. He was adjudicated delinquent, sentenced to community control, and now appeals. We reverse.

Respondent was “punished simply for asserting his right to free speech in what the police considered — and what may well have been — an offensive manner. But the constitution does not permit that result.” L.A.T. v. State, 650 So. 2d 214, 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). “As we all know, ‘[t]he freedom of individuals to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state.’” Id. (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987)).

Respondent never physically interfered with the police, never physically threatened them in any manner, and never impeded the execution of their legal duty. The conduct for which respondent was punished was pure speech, and is thus protected by the First Amendment. Compare K.G. v. State, 338 So. 2d 72, 74 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (“the actions of the juvenile in biting and striking the arresting officers and in obstructing the execution of their legal duty” supported adjudication of delinquency) and L.A.T., 650 So. 2d 214, 218 (“nothing in the First Amendment protects a person who, under the guise of verbally protesting another’s arrest, interferes with a police officer’s lawful arrest of a third party.”)(Hubbart, J., concurring).

REVERSED.


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Citator

Cited By

  • H.A.P. v. State, 834 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)
    …s protected free speech. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). As the law is clear that offensive speech cannot constitutionally serve as a basis for violation of section 842.03, see, e.g., W.L. v. State, 769 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that profane and offensive speech directed to officers is protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution), then surely mere presence3 cannot serve as such a basis. The majority’s construction of sec…
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  • C.H.C. v. State, 988 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
    …sonable suspicion of criminal activity. First, the conduct attributed to C.H.C. before he fled does not constitute “disorderly conduct” because the deputy did not indicate that C.H.C. was inciting an immediate breach of the peace. See W.L. v. State, 769 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (reversing finding of delinquency for disorderly conduct where the child, who was standing in a group of 15-20 people, yelled out a series of profanities at the police when officers approached him and demanded identification); L.A…
  • C.N. v. State, 49 So. 3d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)
    …(Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (stating that juvenile’s loudness and profanity was not disorderly conduct when no evidence showed that the juvenile was trying to incite a crowd or that she had caused a crowd to gather and present a safety risk); W.L. v. State, 769 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (noting that it was not disorderly conduct for a juvenile to stand in a crowd of 15-20 people, yelling profanities at the police). The State maintains that C.N.’s language incited others to fight, thereby resulting in a breach of…

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