STATE ATTORNEY AND STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANTS,
v.
SUZANNE JOHNSON, APPELLEE
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The State Attorney appealed a workers' compensation judge's decision rejecting a unilateral transfer of the claimant's medical care under Florida Statute § 440.13(2)(d). Although the judge mischaracterized the statute as substantive rather than procedural, the court affirmed because the ultimate ruling—that transfer of care remains subject to judicial review—properly accords with workers' compensation law.
Although the judge erred in characterizing § 440.13(2)(d) as substantive, the ruling was correct because the statute does not materially alter the parties' substantive rights. Medical deauthorization under § 440.13(2)(d) may proceed with or without prior judicial approval, but remains subject to after-the-fact judicial review to determine whether the change was in the claimant's best interest.
[1] A statute permitting the transfer of medical care under section 440.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes, does not materially alter the substantive rights of the parties regarding…
[2] A medical deauthorization made under section 440.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes, without prior judicial approval is subject to an after-the-fact determination by a judge as t…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“section 440.13(2)(d) does not materially alter the parties' rights in this regard, as a medical deauthorization made under this statute without prior judicial approval may still be subject to an after-the-fact determination by the judge as to whether deauthorization was in the claimant's best interest”
Establishes the key holding that the statute is procedural and does not change substantive rights regarding judicial review of deauthorization decisions
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe claimant sustained a compensable workers' compensation injury before the deauthorization provision in § 440.13(2)(d) was enacted. The employer sou…
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ALLEN, J.
The employer appeals a workers’ compensation order by which the judge declined to approve a unilateral transfer of medical care pursuant to section 440.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes. We conclude that the judge misperceived the effect of the statute, but that the ultimate determination below was a proper ruling which accords with the requirements of the Workers’ Compensation Law.
The claimant sustained a compensable injury prior to the enactment of the deau-thorization provision in section 440.13(2)(d), which permits a transfer of the medical care being provided an injured employee if an independent, medical examination indicates that the employee is not making appropriate progress in recuperation. The employer relied on this enactment in advising the claimant that it intended to transfer her care from the authorized doctor with whom she had been receiving treatment. The claimant objected to this action and expressed a desire to maintain her existing doctor-patient relationship with the authorized doctor. A motion was submitted to the judge, with the parties presenting argument as to whether section 440.13(2)(d) is a substantive provision which would not apply because the claimant was injured before the statute was enacted, or whether section 440.13(2)(d) is a procedural provision which may apply regardless of the date of accident.
Section 440.13(2)(d) was construed by this court in Terners of Miami Corp. v. Busot, 764 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). The Temers decision was rendered after the challenged ruling in the present case, whereby the judge characterized the statute as a substantive enactment affecting the parties’ rights with regard to the maintenance of an existing doctor-patient relationship. However, Temers indicates that section 440.13(2)(d) does not materially alter the parties’ rights in this regard, as a medical deauthorization made under this statute without prior judicial approval may still be subject to an after-the-fact determination by the judge as to whether deau-thorization was in the claimant’s best interest. As Temers further suggests, this approach accords with the law as it existed prior to the enactment of the deauthorization provision in section 440.13(2)(d). See Furtick v. William Shults Contractor, 664 So. 2d 288 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Cal Kovens Construction v. Lott, 473 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Because section 440.13(2)(d) does not adversely affect the parties’ substantive rights, its application is not governed by the date of accident. But despite mis-charaeterizing the nature of the statute and making a qualified directive as to the continued provision of care with the authorized doctor, the judge indicated that the question of transfer of care remains subject to resolution by a judge of compensation claims. Inasmuch as this accords with the existing law which section 440.13(2)(d) did not alter, so that deauthorization may be made either with prior approval of the judge or subject to a later inquiry as to whether a change in care was in the claimant’s best interest, the ruling comports with the process contemplated by § 440.13(2)(d) as construed in Temers.
The appealed order is affirmed.
JOANOS and DAVIS, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Mylock v. Champion Int'l & Sedgwick Claims Mgmt., 906 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…f the statute, a claimant may prevail on a medical-benefits petition if he or she succeeds in causing the carrier to retract its intention to transfer care, regardless of the timing of the de-authorization. For example, in State Attorney v. Johnson, 770 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), this court affirmed a JCC’s refusal to approve an E/C’s unilateral transfer of medical care, pursuant to section 440.13(2)(d), wherein the carrier advised claimant “that it intended to transfer her care from the authorized docto…
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Avery v. City OF Coral Gables & Johns E., 100 So. 3d 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…transfer the care of an injured employee from the attending health care provider if an independent medical examination determines that the employee is not making appropriate progress in recuperation.” (Emphasis added). See State Attorney v. Johnson, 770 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding because section 440.13(2)(d) does not adversely affect parties’ substantive rights, its application is not governed by date of accident). The issue presented here, which has not yet been addressed by this court, is…
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Marine Max, Inc. v. Blair, 268 So. 3d 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)…mise that the E/C cannot deauthorize a physician without proving that doing so is in the best interest of the claimant is still controlling. Terners of Miami Corp. v. Busot, 764 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); see also State Attorney v. Johnson, 770 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (recognizing statute did not change the substantive test for deauthorization). In fact, we recently recognized the failure to continue to provide treatment to the claimant with a previously authorized doctor constituted a de…
Authorities Cited
- CAL Kovens Constr. & United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lott, 473 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Edison M. Furtick, Jr. v. Contractor, 664 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Terners OF Miami Corp. & Stirling Cooke Ins. Co. v. Busot, 764 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)