MARK A. SHANNON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Mark Shannon was convicted of robbery with a firearm and burglary while armed with a firearm, but the court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court improperly denied his challenges for cause to three jurors who demonstrated bias or inability to be impartial.
The trial court erred in denying challenges for cause to all three jurors. The first two jurors demonstrated bias regarding witness credibility and the defendant's right not to testify; the third juror demonstrated an inability to resist jury pressure. No explanation of why a seated juror is objectionable is required to preserve error when a defendant identifies a juror he would have peremptorily challenged but could not because peremptory challenges were exhausted.
[1] A juror's statement that they would give more credibility to a police witness than a lay witness due to a familial relationship with law enforcement raises reasonable dou…
[2] A juror's equivocation regarding a defendant's right not to testify is a valid ground for granting a challenge for cause.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“statement that a juror would favor the credibility of one class of witnesses over another raises reasonable doubt about impartiality”
Establishes the standard for finding bias based on witness credibility preferences
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring jury selection, one juror stated he could not understand why an innocent person would not speak to their innocence at trial. Another juror indi…
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KLEIN, J.
Appellant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and burglary while armed with a firearm. We reverse and remand for a new trial because the trial court erred in denying appellant’s challenges to jurors for cause.
One juror stated that he could not understand why someone who was innocent would not speak to his innocence at trial. Another juror said that he would give a police witness more credibility than a lay witness because his son-in-law was a police officer with the West Palm Beach Police Department. Neither of these jurors receded from their positions or said they could be fair after expressing these views.
We agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in not granting his challenges to these two jurors for cause. Davis v. State, 656 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)(statement that a juror would favor the credibility of one class of witnesses over another raises reasonable doubt about impartiality); Gibson v. State, 534 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)(equivocation about defendant’s right not to testify is reason to grant challenge to juror for cause).
A third juror admitted on voir dire that he could not promise that he would stand by his convictions in the face of pressure from other jurors because he had previously been a juror in a criminal case and had succumbed to the pressure from other jurors, despite his misgivings. Appellant’s challenge for cause to him should also have been granted.
Appellant used peremptory challenges on all three jurors and renewed his objection to the jury just before, it was sworn. He also identified a juror that he would have exercised a peremptory challenge on if he had not exhausted his peremptory challenges on the jurors he challenged for cause. The state argues that the appellant failed to preserve the error because appellant’s counsel did not explain to the trial court, when he was asked, why the juror he identified was objectionable.
In Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla.1990), our supreme court explained:
Where a defendant seeks reversal based on a claim that he was wrongfully forced to exhaust his peremptory challenges, he initially must identify a specific juror whom he otherwise would have struck peremptorily. This juror must be an individual who actually sat on the jury and whom the defendant either challenged for cause or attempted to challenge peremptorily or otherwise objected to after his peremptory challenges had been exhausted.
Neither Trotter, nor any other authority cited by the state, requires an explanation as to why the juror who sat was objectionable. Nor should an explanation be required since a peremptory challenge is, by definition, a challenge that “need not be supported by any reason, although a party may not use such a challenge in a way that discriminates against a protected minority.” Black’s Law Dictionary 223 (7th ed.1999).
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in ruling that it would allow the state to cross examine appellant about a different crime, if appellant took the stand. Because appellant did not testify, and the evidence of the other crime was not admitted, this issue was not preserved for appellate review. State v. Raydo, 713 So. 2d 996 (Fla.1998). We have considered the other errors raised by appellant and find them to be without merit.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ, concur.
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Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 2004)…e is not used to discriminate against a protected class of venireperson. See Francis, 413 So. 2d at 1179 (“[The peremptory challenge] is an arbitrary and capricious right which must be exercised freely to accomplish its purpose.”); Shannon v. State, 770 So. 2d 714, 716 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (stating that a peremptory challenge “need not be supported by any reason, although a party may not use such a challenge in a way that discriminates against a protected minority”) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 223 (7th ed.…
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Mainon Rodas v. State, 821 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…n for wanting to strike juror Walker, and never attempted to strike juror Walker for cause, he cannot now claim that Walker’s placement on the jury panel resulted in a biased panel. We disagree. We recently addressed this issue in Shannon v. State, 770 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Relying on Trotter, this court explained that “[njeither Trotter, nor any other authority ... requires an explanation as to why the juror who sat was objectionable. Nor should an explanation be required since a peremptory challe…
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Bell v. State, 870 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…648 So. 2d 724 (Fla.1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 920 (Fla.1995) (impartiality of fact finders absolute prerequisite). Contrary to the state’s argument, the defendant has demonstrated that an objectionable juror was seated. See Shannon v. State, 770 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (defendant not required to explain why juror who sat on panel is objectionable because peremptory challenge need not be based on any specific reason). He has also shown prejudice by the error. Ault v. State, 866 So. 2d 674 (Fla.2…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990)
- State v. Raydo, 713 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1998)
- Davis v. State, 656 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Gibson v. State, 534 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)