ARIUS J. LLANOS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Llanos appealed his conviction for kidnapping, burglary, and battery, challenging the trial court's admission of hearsay statements and use of judicial notice regarding his probation status to impeach credibility. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the probation evidence admissible under Florida's hearsay impeachment statute to cast doubt on the appellant's stated motivations.
The trial court did not reversibly err. Although probation status is not a standard method of impeachment under Florida Statutes § 90.610(1), it was admissible under § 90.806(1) to impeach the credibility of the declarant whose hearsay statements were admitted into evidence. The probation evidence provided an equally plausible alternative motivation for appellant's request that the victim remain silent.
[1] The credibility of a declarant whose hearsay statement has been admitted into evidence may be impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements or conduct, regardless of w…
[2] A defendant's probationary status may be admissible to impeach credibility when the defense elicits testimony suggesting the defendant's motivations were remorse or a des…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although this means of impeachment is not afforded by section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes (1999), the declarant's credibility and possible bias may be impeached under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (1999).”
Establishes the applicable statute for impeaching hearsay declarant's credibility when non-standard impeachment evidence is used.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring trial, the victim testified about statements appellant made to her, including apologies and requests that she not contact police, claiming he w…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant appeals his conviction for kidnapping, burglary, and battery.
During the course of the trial, several of appellant’s hearsay statements were admitted into evidence upon defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim.1 The trial judge allowed the state to impeach appellant’s credibility by taking judicial notice of the fact that appellant was on probation at the time of the alleged offenses.
On appeal, appellant contends that because he never took the stand, the trial judge reversibly erred by taking judicial notice of the fact that he was on probation at the time of the alleged offenses.
In order to impeach appellant’s credibility, the trial judge took judicial notice of the fact that appellant was on probation at the time of the alleged offenses. Although this means of impeachment is not afforded by section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes (1999),2 the declarant’s credibility and possible bias may be impeached under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (1999).3 While the fact that a defendant is on probation is not usually admissible for impeachment, the testimony elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination suggested that appellant did not want the victim to notify the police because he was remorseful, he loved her, and he wanted her to resume their relationship. An equally plausible reason that would cast doubt on appellant’s motivation and credibility is that appellant wanted the victim to remain silent about the battery because he was on probation and his arrest could lead to the revocation of his probation.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling under section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1999).
AFFIRMED.
WARNER, C.J., HAZOURI, J., and BAREDULL, THOMAS H., Ill, Associate Judge, concur. . A. I told my sister it was okay, it’s okay, I will talk to him for just a minute, and we did. He wanted me to say absolutely nothing to anybody.
Q. Did he also say to you I am sorry?
A. Yes.
Q. Did he also say to you come back with me?
A. Yes.
Q. I won't do it again, it will be okay?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. During that whole sequence of you all being in the car, going over to his apartment, he never threatened any of you?
A. He said please don't do this, I am in big enough trouble as it is.
. 90.^10 Conviction of certain crimes as impeachment.—
(1) A party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted, or if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment. . ..
.90.806 Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant.—
(1) When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time inconsistent with the declarant’s hearsay statement is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it.
See also United States v. Lawson, 608 F. 2d 1129, 1130 (6th Cir.1979) (applying Fed. R.Evid. 806 which is almost identical to section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1999)).
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Huggins v. State, 889 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2004)…victions when the defendant elicits his or her own exculpatory, hearsay statement through another [*756] witness at trial. See Kelly v. State, 857 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Werley v. State, 814 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Llanos v. State, 770 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Two of those decisions cite the following treatise passage concerning the functionally identical federal evidence provision: “A defendant who chooses not to testify but who succeeds in getting his or her own exculpatory statemen…1 / 2
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Kelly v. State, 857 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.” § 90.806(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). We previously confronted similar impeachment of a defendant’s pretrial statements under sec [*950] tion 90.806 in Llanos v. State, 770 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In affirming the admission of impeachment evidence showing that the declarant-defendant was on probation from a prior conviction when he made the statements, we said: “While the fact that a defendant is on probation is not usua…
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Ross v. State, 913 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…re of his prior convictions. The trial court also erred in allowing the defendant’s probationary status to be brought to the jury’s attention. The fact that a defendant is on probation is not usually admissible for impeachment. See Llanos v. State, 770 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In Llanos, we found a very fact-specific exception. There, the fact that the defendant was on probation at the time of the alleged offenses impeached the defendant’s testimony as to why he did not want the police called to inves…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Lawson, 608 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1979)