VIRGINIA M. CARNESI, APPELLANT,

v.

FERRY PASS UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, PENSACOLA DISTRICT UNITED METHODIST CONFERENCE, ALABAMA WEST FLORIDA UNITED METHODIST CONFERENCE, AND CHET HARRISON, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PASTOR PARISH RELATIONS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, APPELLEES

[*1287] DAVIS, J.

Appellant, Virginia M. Carnesi, appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to appellees, Ferry Pass United Methodist Church, Pensacola District United Methodist Conference, and the Alabama West Florida United Methodist Conference (“church defendants”). We affirm.

Carnesi filed a complaint against the church defendants and church volunteer Chet Harrison, who served as the chairman of the pastor parish relations committee (PPRC), a committee staffed by volunteers which hired Carnesi as a church secretary and bookkeeper and supervised her work. Carnesi alleges that Harrison sexually harassed her; she raises claims of a hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment pursuant to section 760.01, Florida Statutes ’ (1995), and assault, battery, and false imprisonment. The trial court granted the bhurch defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the authority of Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. granted, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla.1999). Evans involves claims of breach of fiduciary duty, negligent hiring, supervision, retention, and outrage based upon a pastor’s sexual relationship with a parishioner. The Evans court concluded that all of the claims were barred by the excessive entanglement doctrine of the First Amendment because the determination of Doe’s claims would involve excessive governmental entanglement with religion.

Similarly, in the instant case, a determination of Carnesi’s claims — which are based upon the actions of a volunteer rather than another employee — will require a secular court to review and interpret church law, policies, and practices to determine whether an agency relationship existed between Harrison, the PPRC, and the church defendants, and whether the church defendants can be held liable for Harrison’s actions. We believe that, as in Evans, this examination would violate the First Amendment’s excessive entanglement doctrine. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED.

BROWNING, J., CONCURS. WOLF, J,, DISSENTS WITH OPINION.

WOLF, J.,

dissenting.

Appellant worked as a bookkeeper for the church. There is no indication that her duties involved religious matters related to the church. Appellant’s alleged harasser served as chairman of a committee appointed by the church to oversee her hiring as well as raises and promotions. It is unclear from the record how many employees the committee supervised or whether they had any responsibilities related to supervision of the pastor or any other employee exercising religious duties.

The alleged wrongdoing of the church involved allowing the harasser to remain in a supervisory capacity over appellant even after it was made aware of his misconduct. The case of Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), rev. granted, 735 So. 2d 1284 (Fla.1999), relied on by the majority, involved a claim that a church had negligently supervised and retained a religious leader of the church. While questions involving the supervision or retention of clergy arguably would raise issues about excessive entanglement with religious decisions of the church, see Doe v. Malicki, 771 So. 2d 545, 548-50 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (Schwartz, J., dissenting), the same concerns are not present in eases involving questions about the church’s supervision of lay persons making employment decisions over lay employees. There is no indication in this case that any decisions made concerning appellant’s employment relationship were made on the basis of religious considerations.

In Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, 991 F. 2d 468 (8th Cir.1993), the court held that while the First Amendment barred adjudication of a minister’s claim that the church had violated its own bylaws, the First Amendment did not necessarily bar consideration by the court of the minister’s remaining claims which had been based on the church having placed false information in the minister’s personnel file and then circulating that file to other churches interested in hiring pastors. Although the court noted that “[p]ersonnel decisions are protected from civil court interference where review by civil courts would require the courts to interpret and apply religious doctrine or ecclesiastical law,” the court went on to state that “[t]he First Amendment does not shield employment decisions made by religious organizations from civil court review ... where the employment decisions do not implicate religious beliefs, procedures, or law.” Id. at 471.

The court indicated that, because it was reviewing an order on a motion to dismiss, it was unclear whether “the evidence offered at trial will definitely involve the district court in an impermissible inquiry into the Synod’s bylaws or religious beliefs.” Id.

The instant case is in a similar litigation posture. In the absence of evidence that the employment decisions made here were motivated by religious considerations, the case should go forward. Sound public policy requires that religious organizations not be given blanket immunity for employment decisions relating to lay employees. I, therefore, dissent.