KPMG PEAT MARWICK, L.L.P., AND WILLIAM WATHEN, APPELLANTS,
v.
MARION BARNER, TOM CARDILLO, LENORE KOHN, SIDNEY KRONICK, SYLVIA KRONICK, JAMES LACEY, ABRAHAM J. PASTMAN, ADELLE PASTMAN, FRANK PATTON, JOHN TODD AND JEAN WOLFF, APPELLEES
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The court held that the trial court's class certification order must be reversed because it failed to comply with procedural rules requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law.
[1] A trial court's order granting class certification must be reversed when the court fails to make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law.
[2] A trial court's failure to state the reasons for its ruling on the record prevents appellate review of whether the court abused its discretion in certifying a class.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiffs purchased securities from a company that later went bankrupt, alleging that the defendant accounting firm's faulty audits caused their loss…
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DAVIS, Judge.
KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P., and William Wathen, a senior auditor at KPMG, appeal the trial court’s non-final order granting Marion Barner’s motion for class certification. We reverse.
Barner and the other named appellees purchased secured notes or preferred stock from Keller Financial Services of Florida, Inc. (“KFS”). They allege that they suffered losses after KFS encountered financial losses and filed for bankruptcy. KPMG is a certified public accountant firm that performed accounting services for KFS.
Barner and the other plaintiffs filed a complaint against KPMG. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552, the plaintiffs alleged that KPMG failed to use reasonable and ordinary care in preparing KFS’ financial statements, which were supplied to KFS for use in a prospectus. The plaintiffs averred that KPMG was directly responsible for the plaintiffs’ losses because the plaintiffs justifiably relied on KPMG’s accounting audits of KFS’ financial statements. The plaintiffs moved the trial court to certify as a class all those who had purchased either secured notes or shares of preferred stock from KFS. The trial court granted that motion, and KPMG appeals.
Although KPMG argues that the plaintiffs could not bring a class action against it under Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 552, we need not reach that question. The parties agree that the trial court’s order certifying the class does not comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(d)(1), which requires the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Furthermore, by taking the certification issue under advisement, the trial judge did not state the reasons for his ruling on the record. Because we cannot discern the trial court’s rationale for its decision, we cannot determine whether it abused its discretion by certifying the class. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s certification order, and remand for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., Concur.
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Citator
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Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 852 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220(d)(1) to support certification but merely made conclusory statements that the parties had established the prerequisites to qualify for class certification. As in KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P. v. Barner, 771 So. 2d 56, 56 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), due to the inadequacy of the order, this court cannot determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by certifying the class. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting the motion for class certification and remand f…
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Terry L. Braun, P.A. v. Campbell, 781 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…t and conclusions of law upon which the determination is based .... [emphasis added]. We agree with appellants that the trial court’s order is devoid of the factual and legal findings required by Rule 1.220(d)(1). As in KPMG Peat Marwick v. Barner, 771 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), it is difficult to discern the court’s rationale for its order. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s certification order and remand for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED. THOMPSON,…
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Ford Motor Co. v. Morris, 904 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…termination is based.”). Absent specific findings, we cannot discern whether the trial court applied the correct analysis when making its decision. See Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 852 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); KPMG Peat Marwick, L.L.P. v. Barner, 771 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). We therefore reverse the order granting the motion for class certification, decertify the proposed class, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED. WEBSTER, HAWKES, and THOMAS JJ., concur.…
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