MARK A. LUNDY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2000-09-29
No. 2D99-1862
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., Concur.
771 So. 2d 1180 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2000)

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Synopsis

Mark Lundy appeals sentences imposed under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, challenging its constitutionality on substantive due process and equal protection grounds. The court affirms the sentences, finding that most issues are controlled by precedent and that Lundy's novel argument regarding the Act's distinction between Florida and out-of-state releasees lacks merit.


Holding

The court affirmed the sentences, finding that Lundy's arguments regarding substantive due process and equal protection based on the in-state/out-of-state distinction lack merit under existing precedent. The court distinguished Lundy's case on double jeopardy grounds because he was not sentenced as both a habitual offender and under the Act, unlike defendants in related cases.


Headnotes

[1] A statute's distinction between defendants previously incarcerated in and released from a Florida prison versus those released from other prison systems may lack a ration…

[2] A defendant's argument that a statute violates substantive due process and equal protection guarantees based on a distinction between those released from Florida prisons…

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Key Quotes

“Mark A. Lundy appeals the sentences imposed pursuant to his plea agreement for which he reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act.”

Establishes that Lundy preserved his constitutional challenge through a plea agreement reservation

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Facts & Procedural History

Lundy pleaded guilty and received sentences pursuant to a plea agreement that reserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of the Prison Rele…

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Opinion of the Court
SALCINES, Judge.

[*1181] SALCINES, Judge.

Mark A. Lundy appeals the sentences imposed pursuant to his plea agreement for which he reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. Most of the issues he raises are clearly controlled by Grant v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), review granted, No. SC99-164, 761 So. 2d 329 (Fla. Apr. 12, 2000), and State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000), and we affirm those without discussion. However, Lundy argues that the Act facially offends substantive due process and equal protection guarantees based upon a shortcoming not expressly addressed in either Grant or Cotton. He maintains that the Act violates substantive due process and equal protection guarantees because it draws a distinction between defendants who were previously incarcerated in and released from a Florida prison and those who were previously incarcerated in and released from other prison systems. That distinction, he maintains, lacks a rational basis and bears no rational relationship to any legitimate legislative purpose. To the extent that Lundy’s exact argument has not been disposed of by this court in Grant and the supreme court in Cotton, we find it unavailing.

Regarding Lundy’s argument that the Act offends prohibitions against double jeopardy, we acknowledge that our sister courts have found the Act to suffer such a flaw. See Dragani v. State, 759 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); West v. State, 758 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In so doing, however, we note that Lundy was not sentenced both as a habitual offender and under the Act as were the defendants in Grant, West, and Dragani.

Affirmed.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and BLUE, J., Concur.


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