WILLIE ALBERT BOOKER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Booker challenged the denial of his motion to withdraw a nolo contendere plea to second-degree murder, arguing his sentence was based on unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines. The court affirmed the denial because the sentence imposed could have been legally imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure, making him ineligible for relief under the Heggs standard.
Booker is not entitled to relief because his actual sentence of 200 months could have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure. Under Heggs, only those adversely affected by the 1995 amendments are entitled to relief, and a defendant must show his sentence could not have been imposed under the prior guidelines.
[1] A defendant may be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty if the plea was based upon a misunderstanding or misapprehension of facts considered by the defendant in making th…
[2] A defendant is not entitled to relief under Heggs v. …
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“only those persons adversely affected by the amendments made by chapter 95-184 may rely on our decision here to obtain relief. Stated another way, in the sentencing guidelines context, we determine that if a person's sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines could have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines (without a departure), then that person shall not be entitled to relief under our decision here.”
This quote establishes the Heggs standard that limits relief to those whose sentences could not have been imposed under the prior guidelines, the key prejudice requirement that controls the outcome.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBooker pled nolo contendere to second-degree murder in exchange for a sentence capped at 234.9 months under the 1995 guidelines. The trial court sente…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges an order of the trial court summarily denying his motion for postconviction relief in which the appellant sought to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere. We conclude that the appellant’s allegations are legally insufficient under the supreme court’s ruling in Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000), and affirm.
According to the appellant’s timely sworn 3.850 motion, he pled nolo contende-re to second-degree murder in exchange for a sentence capped at the bottom of his 1995 guidelines scoresheet of 234.9 months. The trial court sentenced the appellant to 200 months in prison pursuant to this agreement. The appellant further alleged that his sentence is illegal because the 1995 sentencing guidelines have been declared unconstitutional in Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). In support, he alleged that his offense was committed on August 17, 1996, which is within the window established in Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla.2000). He alleged that since his sentence was imposed based on the unconstitutional 1995 scoresheet, he can not be held to his plea agreement where the cap under the 1994 guidelines would have only been 141 months in prison.
The trial court denied the appellant’s motion because his sentence could be imposed under the 1994 guidelines without a departure since the sentencing range would be 141 to 235 months.
Ordinarily, the appellant’s allegations of mistake and misinformation would be sufficient to state a prima facie ease for relief.
It is a well-established principle of law that a defendant should be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty where the plea was based upon a misunderstanding or misapprehension of facts considered by the defendant in making the plea.
See Forbert v. State, 437 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Fla.1983); see also e.g., Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1971) (holding that a judge should be liberal in the exercise of his discretion to allow withdrawal of a plea where it is shown that the plea was based upon a failure of communication or misunderstanding of the facts); Catinella v. State, 732 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), (reiterating that a plea of guilty should be entered voluntarily by one who is competent to know the consequences and should not be induced by fear, misapprehension, undue persuasion, promises, mistake, fraud, inadvertence or ignorance).
However, the supreme court in Heggs narrowed the class of inmates entitled to resentencing by imposing a specific “prejudice” requirement:
[Ojnly those persons adversely affected by the amendments made by chapter 95-184 may rely on our decision here to obtain relief. Stated another way, in the sentencing guidelines context, we determine that if a person’s sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines could have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines (without a departure), then that person shall not be entitled to relief under our decision here.
Id. at 627.
In the present case, the appellant’s claim to relief clearly rests upon the decision in Heggs. But since the sentence actually imposed, 200 months in prison, could have been imposed under the 1994 sentencing guidelines without a departure, we must conclude that the appellant’s allegations are legally insufficient under Heggs to entitle him to relief.
We accordingly affirm the summary denial of the order denying the appellant’s motion for postconviction relief.
BARFIELD, C.J., MINER and ALLEN, JJ., CONCUR.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (19 total)
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Gregory Banks v. State, 887 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 2004)…tencing pursuant to Heggs because (1) his plea was for a negotiated term of years and was not tied to the guidelines and (2) his sentence could have been imposed under the 1994 guidelines. Id. Furthermore, relying on its decision in Booker v. State, 771 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), review dismissed, 804 So. 2d 328 (Fla.2001), the First District determined that Banks’ claim to withdraw his plea also failed because his sentence fell within the range permissible under the 1994 guidelines. M4 Moreover, the Fir…1 / 3
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Foster v. State, 794 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…dant is not within the group of persons entitled to postconviction relief under Heggs. We have previously held that Heggs itself defines who is entitled to relief. Mullins v. State, 773 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000).3 We agree with Booker v. State, 771 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), review granted, No. SC00-2693, 791 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. June 15, 2001), on this point. We certify direct conflict with Murphy and Mortimer. Affirmed; direct conflict certified. . The crime date was October 9, 1995. . The "depart…
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Hipps v. State, 790 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…prejudice to appellant’s right to seek relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 under the theory that his plea was involuntary. See Jones v. State, 781 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In so saying, we distinguish Booker v. State, 771 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), review granted, SC00-2693, 791 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. June 15, 2001), because appellant, who was sentenced within the October 1, 1995 through May 24, 1997, window period, has shown that the sentence he received could not have been im…
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Xzavier Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000)
- Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1971)
- Forbert v. State, 437 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1983)
- Catinella v. State, 732 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)