JAMES DALE PELHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Dale Pelham was convicted of DUI manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident involving death arising from a single vehicular incident that killed a pedestrian. The appellate court affirmed the DUI manslaughter conviction but vacated the leaving the scene conviction, concluding that two convictions based on a single death improperly enhance both offenses, and remanded for resentencing under valid sentencing guidelines.
Two convictions enhanced by a single death are improper; therefore, the DUI manslaughter conviction is affirmed while the leaving the scene conviction is vacated. Additionally, because the 1995 sentencing guidelines were held unconstitutional, the case is remanded for resentencing under the valid guidelines in effect at the time of the offense.
[1] A defendant cannot be convicted and sentenced for both DUI manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death based on a single death.
[2] When a defendant is improperly convicted of two offenses enhanced by a single death, the conviction for the lesser offense should be vacated.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is inappropriate to enhance the degree of both crimes by using a single homicide”
Establishes the core legal principle that multiple convictions cannot be enhanced by the same criminal event
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn October 18, 1996, Pelham hit and killed a pedestrian while driving home from a bar. The State charged him with DUI manslaughter and leaving the sce…
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PER CURIAM.
James Dale Pelham appeals his convictions and sentences for DUI manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident involving death. We affirm Pelham’s conviction for DUI manslaughter without comment. However, we remand this case to the trial court to vacate Pelham’s conviction for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death.
On October 18, 1996, Pelham hit and killed a pedestrian while driving home from a bar. The State charged Pelham with DUI manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident involving death based on this incident. A jury found Pelham guilty as charged, and the trial court adjudicated Pelham guilty of both offenses and sentenced him to a guidelines sentence under the 1995 sentencing guidelines.
Pelham contends that the trial court improperly adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him on two separate convictions enhanced by a single death. The State concedes that two convictions enhanced by a single death are improper. See State v. Cooper, 634 So. 2d 1074, 1074-75 (Fla.1994) (holding that it is improper to convict and sentence a defendant for both DUI manslaughter' and driving while license suspended and causing the death of another based on a single death, but noting that a defendant could be convicted of both DUI manslaughter and driving while license suspended or revoked); State v. Chapman, 625 So. 2d 838 (Fla.1993) (holding that it is improper to convict and sentence a defendant for both DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide based on a single death).
No Florida case addresses the issue of convictions for both DUI manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death based on a single death.
However, applying the logic of Cooper and Chapman to this case, we conclude that one of Pelham’s convictions must be vacated.
Cooper holds that “it is inappropriate to enhance the degree of both crimes by using a single homicide.” Cooper, 634 So. 2d at 1075.
Section 316.061, Florida Statutes (1995), makes it a misdemeanor for a driver to leave the scene of an accident resulting in any property damage.
Section 316.027(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), makes it a third-degree felony for a driver to leave the scene of an accident resulting in injury to any person.
Section 316.027(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), makes it a second-degree felony for a driver to leave the scene of an accident resulting in the death of any person. Clearly, the punishment for leaving the scene of an accident is enhanced by a death. Pelham’s DUI manslaughter conviction has already been enhanced by the death of the pedestrian.
Therefore, we conclude that Pel-ham’s leaving the scene conviction cannot be enhanced by that same death, and one of the two convictions must be vacated.
Pelham correctly points out that the conviction for the lesser offense is usually vacated. See Collins v. State, 605 So. 2d 568, 569 n. 6 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). In this case, both offenses are second-degree felonies; however, the leaving the scene conviction is scored at level five while the DUI manslaughter conviction is scored at level eight. See § 921.0012, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). Therefore, we affirm Pelham’s conviction for DUI manslaughter and vacate Pelham’s conviction for leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death.
Pelham also points out that his original sentencing scoresheet was calculated using the 1995 sentencing guidelines. The supreme court recently held that the 1995 sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional. See Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). Pelham’s offense date falls within the window for relief under Heggs. See Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924, 928 (Fla.2000). Therefore, in resentencing Pelham, the trial court must use the valid guidelines in effect on the date of his offense.
Affirmed in part; vacated in part and remanded.
PARKER, A.C.J., and FULMER and WHATLEY, JJ„ Concur.
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McKNIGHT v. State, 906 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…ictions for DUI manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident arising out of one accident, although involving death as a common element, are not contrary to legislative intent and do not constitute double jeopardy; receding from Pelham v. State, 771 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)), review denied, 821 So. 2d 297 (Fla.2002). . We note with interest that violation of section 316.027(1) is a felony, while violation of section 316.062 constitutes a noncriminal traffic infraction.…
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Lawrence v. State, 801 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…lude death as an element, convictions for both of these offenses based upon one accident are not contrary to legislative intent and do not constitute double jeopardy. Our affir-mance requires that we recede from our prior opinion in Pelham v. State, 771 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). On September 24, 1998, at approximately midnight, Ms. Lawrence hit and killed a pedestrian with her car. She was intoxicated. She left the scene of this accident. She was charged with DUI manslaughter and leaving the scene of an…1 / 2
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Pelham v. State, 815 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…appeal, this court affirmed Pelham’s DUI manslaughter conviction but vacated his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving death, because it arose out of the same criminal episode as the DUI manslaughter offense. See Pelham v. State, 771 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (Pelham I ).1 Pursuant to Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000), this court, in Pelham I, also reversed Pelham’s 1995 guidelines sentence and remanded for a de novo resentencing under the 1994 guidelines. 771 So. 2d at 1255.…
Authorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Xzavier Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Chapman, 625 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Cooper, 634 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1994)
- Collins v. State, 605 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)