CEDRICK E. SPANN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Cedrick Spann was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer and sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed his sentence, rejecting his double jeopardy challenge and overruling its prior decision in Oliveira v. State that had prohibited the combination of statutory enhancements.
The court held that the combination of these two statutory enhancements is constitutional and does not violate double jeopardy. Where the legislature has provided multiple sentencing enhancements with no indication they are mutually exclusive, both enhancements may be applied.
[1] A statute enhancing a battery offense to a felony when committed against a law enforcement officer, and a separate statute authorizing increased sentences for prison rele…
[2] The Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Determination of punishment for crimes is a legislative matter. Because the legislature has provided both these subsections, both are to be followed. Absent an indication from the legislature that these subsections are an either/or proposition, both subsections will be followed.”
Establishes the court's principle that multiple statutory enhancements are to be applied when the legislature provides them without indication they are mutually exclusive.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSpann was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer under Florida Statute § 784.07, which elevates battery from a misdemeanor to a third-degre…
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KLEIN, J.
Appellant was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer and challenges his sentence as a prison releasee reoffender, arguing that there was a double enhancement of his penalty and that under Oliveira v. State, 751 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), this constituted double jeopardy. We now recognize that we were wrong in Oliveira and recede from that opinion.
In Oliveira the defendant was also convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer. Section 784.07, Florida Statutes (1997), enhances the offense of battery, which is normally a misdemeanor, to a third degree felony, where it is committed on certain persons including law enforcement officers. Defendant’s sentence was also enhanced under the habitual felony offender statute, and we held that this was a double enhancement which is barred by double jeopardy. As authority for that conclusion we cited Gayman v. State, 616 So. 2d 17 (Fla.1993), but we now recognize that Gayman does not support that conclusion.
In Gayman, the defendant was convicted of petit theft, which was reclassified from a misdemeanor to a felony because he had two prior convictions of petit theft. Felony petit theft was subject to a maximum sentence of five years. He was then sentenced as a habitual offender, exposing him to a greater sentence than could have been imposed for felony petit theft. Gay-man argued that the two enhancements violated double jeopardy; however, the supreme court rejected that argument. Gayman does not support our conclusion in Oliveira that a double enhancement is prohibited, and we have found no other authority which does support it.
In State v. Whitehead, 472 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla.1985), the defendant was convicted of second degree murder with a firearm. Section 775.087(1) provided that when a person commits a felony with a firearm the sentence is to be reclassified one category higher. Section 775.087(2) provided that people who commit specified crimes with a firearm are required to serve three years before becoming eligible for parole. In holding that applying both of these statutes was not an improper double enhancement, the court explained:
Determination of punishment for crimes is a legislative matter. Because the legislature has provided both these subsections, both are to be followed. Absent an indication from the legislature that these subsections are an either/or proposition, both subsections will be followed.
Whitehead was consistent with Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678, 74 L.Ed.2d 535, 542 (1983), in which the United States Supreme Court wrote: “the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla.1989)(quoting Hunter).
In the present case, the legislature made battery, which is ordinarily a misdemean-or, a third degree felony when the victim is a law enforcement officer. § 784.07(2)(b). In section 775.082(8)(a)l.o, the legislature authorized increased sentences for defendants who qualify as prison releasee reof-fenders and have committed certain .felonies. Absent an ambiguity, and there is none here, the imposition of one sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act is not improper, and we recede from Oli-veira.
Appellant also attacks the constitutionality of section 775.082(8)(a)l. We affirm based on State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000) and Rollinson v. State, 743 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), rev. granted, No. SC96713, 761 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Apr.12, 2000) (Table).
Affirmed.
WARNER, C.J., DELL, GUNTHER, STONE, POLEN, STEVENSON, SHAHOOD, GROSS, TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur. FARMER, J., concurring specially with opinion.
FARMER, J.,
concurring.
While I concur in the court’s decision today, I emphasize that Spann’s challenge to his sentence would still be permissible under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The fact that the victim of his battery was a law enforcement officer was submitted to the jury, not independently determined by the sentencing judge. The habitual felony offender issue relates to his prior criminal history of convictions and is therefore properly determined by the judge. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) (“[Ujnder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) [emphasis supplied] that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Cited By (18 total)
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State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007)…ence.” That holding conflicts with cases from other courts of appeal. See Jenkins v. State, 884 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); State v. Crenshaw, 792 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Brown v. State, 789 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Spann v. State, 772 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Branch v. State, 790 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We resolve these conflicts by (A) examining the relevant statutes involved in this case; (B) reviewing the test we articulated in Perkins for determining whether an offense i…1 / 2
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Gayson Mills v. State, 822 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 2002)…See Brown v. State, 789 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA) (applying prison releasee reoffender statute), review denied, 796 So. 2d 535 (Fla.2001); Mills v. State, 773 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (applying habitual felony offender statute); Spann v. State, 772 So. 2d 38, 39-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (applying prison releasee reoffender statute); King v. State, 763 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (applying habitual felony offender statute); cf. also Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655, 658 (Fla.2000) (approving imposition of…
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Roberts v. State, 923 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…sell v. State, 813 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002): With respect to double enhancements, the double jeopardy clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended. Spann v. State, 772 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (quoting State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla.1989)). In addressing a similar issue, the supreme court has concluded that where two enhancement provisions serve different purposes and the legislature has not indicated tha…
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000)
- Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (U.S. 1983)
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Smith, 547 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1989)
- Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (U.S. 1999)
- Rollinson v. State, 743 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- THE Florida BAR v. Jones, 472 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1985)
- Dorcy Gayman v. State, 616 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Whitehead, 472 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1985)
- Oliveira v. State, 751 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)