THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JOSEPH SIDDAL, APPELLEE
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The State appealed the dismissal of its petition to civilly commit Joseph Siddal as a Sexually Violent Predator under Florida's involuntary civil commitment statute. The trial court dismissed the petition because Siddal was on probation, not in custody, on the effective date of the Act, and the statute applies only to persons currently in custody. The appellate court affirmed, holding that 'custody' does not include probationers.
The court held that 'custody' does not include persons on probation under the Sexually Violent Predators Act. Accordingly, because Siddal was on probation on the Act's effective date, the Act did not apply to him, and the trial court properly dismissed the State's petition for civil commitment.
[1] The Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act applies to persons in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as well as future…
[2] The term "custody" in the context of civil commitment for sexually violent predators does not include persons on probation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Sections 916.31-916.49 apply to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in statute 916.32(8), as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense in the future.”
The statute at issue, which the court interpreted to limit coverage to persons 'in custody'
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSiddal was adjudicated guilty of lewd or lascivious assault on May 9, 1995. On May 18, 1999, the State Attorney filed a petition for involuntary civil…
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NESBITT, Senior Judge.
The State appeals the dismissal of its petition for involuntary civil commitment of defendant, Joseph E. Siddal, as a Sexually Violent Predator. Siddal was adjudicated guilty of lewd or lascivious assault on May 9, 1995. On May 18, 1999, the State Attorney filed a Petition for Civil Commitment under the “Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators” Act, pursuant to 916.31 et seq. of the Florida Statutes. Section 916.45 Florida Statutes(Supp.l998)1 provides:
Sections 916.31-916.49 apply to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in statute 916.32(8), as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense in the future.
The trial court found that Siddal was on probation on January 1, 1999, the effective date of the act. The court rejected the State’s argument that the term “custody” should include persons on probation. As well as finding that Siddal was not in custody on the effective date of the Act, the court found that Siddal had not been convicted for committing any sexually violent offense, or any other offense, since his May 9, 1995 conviction. Thus, the court decided, section 916.45 did not apply to Siddal. We agree.
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 357 (2d college ed.1982) defines the word custody as:
1. The act or right of guarding, esp. such a right granted by a court. 2. The state of being detained or held under guard, esp. by the police.
We conclude that, especially considering the serious consequences of the statutory section at issue, the liberal reading of the term advocated by the state is not supported by the terminology employed or the section’s legislative history. Also, we find unpersuasive the state’s reliance on State v. Bolyea, 520 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla.1988). While it is true that in Bolyea the Supreme Court concluded the term “custody under sentence” included court ordered probation, this conclusion was clearly for the limited purpose of permitting probationers to seek post conviction relief, a very different issue than the question before us.
Accordingly, the order under review is affirmed.
. Section 916.45 was renumbered as 394.925 and amended by Laws of Florida 1999, chapter 99-222, section 20, effective May 26, 1999 and now reads:
This part applies to all persons currently in custody who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, as that term is defined in s. 394.912(9), as well as to all persons convicted of a sexually violent offense and sentenced to total confinement in the future.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Gordon v. Regier, 839 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…nd ordinary meaning of [a] word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.” Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471 (Fla.1992). Southwest Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Charlotte County, 774 So. 2d 903, 915 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The case of State v. Siddal, 772 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), held that a person on probation was not in “custody” for the purposes of the Act. Siddal cited to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 357 (2d college ed.1982), which defines custody as: “1. The act or right o…1 / 2
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Larimore v. State, 917 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…re’s 15-year prison sentence expired on October 10, 1998. Although Larimore was serving five years of probation on January 1, 1999, the effective date of the Jimmy Ryce Act, probation was not “custody” within the meaning of the Act. State v. Siddal, 772 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). After the effective date of the Act, the court revoked probation and resentenced Larimore to five years in prison. However, Larimore could not be considered in lawful custody on the five-year sentence because this court subseque…
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Barber v. State, 988 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…his question: Are the terms “in custody” and “total confinement,” as used in separate clauses of section 394.925, synonymous in the context of a person on conditional release? Barber, and the dissent, concludes that they are, citing State v. Siddal, 772 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), and Gordon v. Regier, 839 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), disagreed with on other grounds in Larimore v. State, 917 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), review granted in 935 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2006). In reaching this conclusion, these…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Bolyea, 520 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1988)