MARVIN H. SHONG, APPELLANT,
v.
JOYCE JACKSON SHONG, APPELLEE
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The appellate court reversed a trial court's award of $57,500 to the wife, representing one-half the increase in value of a marital home, because a prenuptial agreement explicitly provided that each party's separate property would remain separate with no interest acquired in any increase or profits therefrom.
The prenuptial agreement language precludes the award of an equity interest in the increase in value of the separate property home. The trial court's $57,500 award to the wife must be reversed because the prenuptial agreement explicitly protected the husband's separate property, including any increases in value, and there was no evidence of waiver or amendment of this language.
[1] A prenuptial agreement provision stating that the property of each party, real, personal or mixed, now owned or hereafter acquired, shall remain his or her separate prope…
[2] A trial court's award of an equity interest in the increase in value of a marital home, contrary to a prenuptial agreement, is reversible error when there is no evidence…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The property of each party, real, personal or mixed, now owned by him or her and hereafter acquired by him or her and wheresoever situated, shall be and remain his or her separate property...the other party shall not acquire by virtue of the marriage for himself or herself, his or any interest in the income, rents, increase, profits or dividends therefrom.”
The prenuptial agreement language that the trial court improperly disregarded in awarding the wife an interest in the home's appreciation.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband owned a home in Massachusetts prior to marriage. During the marriage, the wife contributed to mortgage payments, reducing the mortgage deb…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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COBB, J.
The issue in this case is whether the following language in a prenuptial agreement precludes the trial court from awarding a 50 percent equity interest in the increase in value of the parties’ marital home in Massachusetts even though solely owned by the husband prior to marriage:
The property of each party, real, personal or mixed, now owned by him or her and hereafter acquired by him or her and wheresoever situated, shall be and remain his or her separate property, subject entirely to his or her controlling use, with full rights at all times to enjoy, manage, convey, mortgage, grant, alienate and dispose of the same by deed, will or otherwise, upon his or her sole signature, the same as if he or she were unmarried, and the other party shall not acquire by virtue of the marriage for himself or herself, his or any interest in the income, rents, increase, profits or dividends therefrom.
The sum of $57,500.00 awarded to the wife represents one-half of the increase in the value of the home during the marriage. The award was based upon the fact that the wife contributed mortgage payments on the home, and the mortgage debt was reduced by $115,000.00 during the marriage. There was no evidence of any waiver or amendment of the prenuptial language relating to the word “increase.” The trial court did not explain its disregard of the prenuptial language. Accordingly, we reverse the equity award of $57,500.00 to the wife. See Haddad v. Haddad, 686 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
We find no merit in the argument of the appellant in regard to the attorney fee award by the trial court. See Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla.1997).
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.
SAWAYA and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ„ concur.
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