MORRIS L. GRAY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Morris Gray appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition (treated as a Rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief) challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea based on the trial court's failure to inform him of potential deportation consequences. The court reverses and remands in light of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Peart v. State, which clarifies the timeliness requirements for such claims.
Gray's motion is timely under the newly clarified standard in Peart v. State, which provides that the two-year limitation period begins when the defendant has or should have knowledge of the threat of deportation, and permits claims filed within two years of Peart's decision date. The claim is facially sufficient, and the case is remanded for the trial court to determine if the allegation is conclusively refuted by the record or whether an evidentiary hearing is required.
[1] A motion for postconviction relief is timely if filed within two years of the date a defendant gains or should have gained knowledge of the threat of deportation, when th…
[2] Defendants who gained knowledge of the threat of deportation prior to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Peart v. …
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court made it clear that the two-year limitation period applicable to a defendant's claim that the trial court failed to inform the defendant of possible deportation following entry of a guilty plea begins to run when the defendant has or should have knowledge of the threat of deportation”
Establishes the correct standard for when the statute of limitations begins to run for deportation-consequence claims under Rule 3.172.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGray entered guilty pleas to various charges in two separate cases in 1990 and received thirty-month prison sentences in each case, to run concurrentl…
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[*31] PER CURIAM.
Morris L. Gray appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus which the trial court correctly treated as a motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We reverse and remand in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Peart v. State, 756 So. 2d 42 (Fla.2000), decided after entry of the order on appeal.
Gray entered a guilty plea to various charges in two separate cases in 1990. He received thirty-month prison sentences in both cases, the terms to run concurrently. In his petition, Gray alleges his plea was involuntary because the trial court failed to inform him of the potential deportation consequences of his plea, as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172. The transcript of the sentencing hearing confirms Gray did not receive the notice required by rule 3.172.
The trial court denied the motion, finding it was not timely filed nor subject to the newly discovered evidence exception found in rule 3.850. However, in Peart, the supreme court made it clear that the two-year limitation period applicable to a defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to inform the defendant of possible deportation following entry of a guilty plea begins to run when the defendant has or should have knowledge of the threat of deportation. Peart, 756 So. 2d at 46. Furthermore, the court’s opinion provided that defendants who gained knowledge of the threat‘of deportation prior to the filing date of its decision shall have two years from its filing date to file a rule 3.850 motion. Id. Accordingly, Gray’s motion is timely.
Because Gray’s claim is facially sufficient in all other respects,1 we remand this matter to the trial court to reconsider Gray’s motion in light of Peart. On remand, the trial court may again deny Gray’s motion if his allegation is conclusively refuted by record attachment. If not, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on his claim.
Reversed and remanded.
BLUE, A.C.J., and WHATLEY and STRINGER, JJ., Concur. . We note that in Peart v. State, 756 So. 2d 42 (Fla.2000), the supreme court stated that in order for a defendant to obtain postconviction relief based on a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(c)(8) violation, the defendant had to prove that the trial court did not provide advice regarding the possible immigration consequences of the plea and resultant prejudice. Id. at 47. To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant has to establish that he did not know that the plea might result in deportation, that he was "threatened” with deportation because of the plea, and that had he known of the possible consequence, he would not have entered the plea. Id. Gray’s motion contains all of these allegations.
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Citator
Cited By
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State v. Owran Green, 944 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 2006)…3), the Fourth District determined that a 2002 motion to withdraw a 1990 plea, filed less than a year after the defendant received notice to appear in deportation proceedings, was timely. Id. at 1239. Likewise, in the 2000 decision in Gray v. State, 774 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), the trial court denied a postconviction motion claiming a rule 3.172(c)(8) violation on a 1990 plea on grounds that it was untimely and not subject to the exception for newly discovered evidence. The Second District reversed, con…
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State v. Freijo, 987 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)…th DCA 2003), filed twelve years after the plea; Alfaro v. State, 828 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), filed fifteen years after the plea; Ghanavati v. State, 820 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), filed fourteen years after the plea; and Gray v. State, 774 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), filed ten years after the plea. Green, 944 So. 2d at 214. The Court described the problems flowing from such delays: Delayed filing hampers adjudication because transcripts of plea colloquies that would demonstrate whether defen…
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Martinez v. State, 842 So. 2d 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…that the trial court failed to inform the defendant of possible deportation following entry of a guilty plea begins to run when the defendant has or should have knowledge of the threat of deportation. Peart, 756 So. 2d at 46; see also Gray v. State, 774 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Accordingly, Mr. Martinez’s claim cannot be ruled untimely on its face. Because Mr. Martinez’s claim is facially sufficient in all other respects, we remand this matter to the trial court to reconsider his motion. On remand, the…
Authorities Cited
- Roan Peart v. State, 756 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2000)