D.C.W., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A juvenile appealed his adjudication of delinquency for battery on a detention facility staff member, challenging whether he validly waived his right to counsel. The court reversed because the trial court's inquiry into the waiver was inadequate under Florida Juvenile Procedure Rule 8.165(b)(2), failing to ensure the juvenile understood the right and its implications.
The trial court's inquiry was inadequate. The rule requires the court to make a thorough inquiry into the child's comprehension of the offer of counsel and capacity to make that choice intelligently and understandingly, but here only minimal confirmation was obtained. The court must reverse and remand to allow D.C.W. to withdraw his plea.
[1] A juvenile's waiver of the right to counsel must be in writing if made at the time of a plea of guilty or no contest or at the adjudicatory hearing.
[2] A juvenile shall not be deemed to have waived the assistance of counsel until the court has completed the entire process of offering counsel and conducted a thorough inqu…
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel in a juvenile proceeding appears to require the court to: (1) inform the juvenile of the benefits he would relinquish and the danger and disadvantages of representing himself, (2) determine whether the juvenile's choipe was made voluntarily and intelligently, and (8) determine whether any unusual circumstances existed which would preclude the juvenile from exercising his right to represent himself.”
Establishes the three-part test for valid waiver of counsel in juvenile proceedings
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceD.C.W., a juvenile, entered a no contest plea to battery on a detention facility staff member in Polk County. Before arraignment, the judge gave a gro…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Adjudication Of Delinquency cases and more on FLexlaw
SALCINES, Judge.
D.C.W., a juvenile, appeals his adjudication of delinquency as well as his commitment for an indeterminate period of time. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In Polk County, D.C.W. entered a plea of no contest to the charge of battery on a detention facility staff member in violation of section 784.075, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998). On appeal, D.C.W. argues that at the time he entered into the plea, the trial court did not adequately determine if his waiver of counsel was voluntarily and knowingly made in accordance with Florida Juvenile Procedure Rule 8.165(b)(2), which governs the determination of whether a juvenile defendant has voluntarily waived his right to counsel. '
The rule requires the trial court to offer counsel to the juvenile and to make “a thorough inquiry into the child’s comprehension of that offer and the capacity to make that choice intelligently and understandingly....” As discussed in B.F. v. State, 747 So. 2d 1061, 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000):
A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel in a juvenile proceeding appears to require the court to: (1) inform the juvenile of the benefits he would relinquish and the danger and disadvantages of representing himself, (2) determine whether the juvenile’s choipe was made voluntarily and intelligently, and (8) determine whether any unusual circumstances existed which would preclude the juvenile from exercising his right to represent himself.
In the present case, D.C.W. appeared for arraignment in a juvenile delinquency proceeding without the benefit of counsel. Before the proceedings commenced, the judge presented a speech to the group of juvenile defendants before him and informed them of their rights. This speech was not transcribed. When D.C.W.’s case was called by the court, the judge made a very abbreviated inquiry concerning D.C.W.’s right to counsel:
THE COURT: Okay. And you heard my speech about all your rights?
THE COURT: Did you understand all that?
THE COURT: You understand you’re giving up all those rights, including your right to an attorney?
The foregoing colloquy was inadequate to have met the requirements of Florida Juvenile Procedure Rule 8.165(b)(2). As in B.F., D.C.W. was minimally informed that he had a right to be represented by counsel; however, no inquiry was made into his comprehension of the right to counsel or his capacity to waive that right in an intelligent and understanding fashion.
This issue may be reviewed for the first time on appeal because the failure to adequately advise a juvenile of his right to counsel constitutes fundamental error.1 See S.S. v. State, 744 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); B.P. v. State, 759 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); T.G. v. State, 741 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), review granted, 751 So. 2d 1254 (Fla.2000). Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court with directions that D.C.W. be allowed to withdraw his plea.
After the trial court accepted the plea, D.C.W. was transferred to Manatee County for a disposition hearing and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of commitment. The State has conceded that this disposition was improper. Therefore, upon resentencing, the trial court should not impose an indeterminate term of commitment and should ensure that the term imposed does not exceed the five year legal maximum for the charged offense.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
BLUE, A.C.J., and FULMER J., Concur. . We note that the Fourth District cited to our decision in J.M.B. v. State, 750 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), to support its holding that there must be a motion to withdraw a plea in order to preserve the issue for appeal. See J.A. v. State, 758 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). However, J.M.B. is not applicable because that case questioned the voluntary nature of a plea and did not involve the issue of the failure to inform a juvenile of his right to be represented by counsel in accordance with Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.165(b)(2).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
C.K. v. State, 909 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…ile’s choice [to waive the assistance of counsel] was made voluntarily and intelligently, and (3) determine whether any unusual circumstances existed which would preclude the juvenile from exercising his right to represent himself. D.C.W. v. State, 775 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). “[I]f the waiver of counsel is invalid as a matter of law, it follows that the guilty plea entered without advice of counsel should also be deemed involuntary as a matter of law.” State v. T.G., 800 So. 2d 204, 213 (Fla.2001…
-
G.E.F. v. State, 782 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…iver shall be accepted where it appears that the party is unable to make an intelligent and understanding choice because of mental condition, age, education, experience, the nature or complexity of the case, or other factors. As in D.C.W. v. State, 775 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), the record in the present case indicates that an abbreviated inquiry regarding waiver of counsel was made, but failed to satisfy the requirements of rule 8.165. Accordingly, we reverse. Reversed and remanded. CASANUEVA, A.C.J.,…
-
T.M. v. State, 811 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…his plea, as contemplated by rule 8.165. See P.L.S. v. State, 745 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). See also G.E.F. v. State, 782 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reversing for failure to conduct proper inquiry into waiver of counsel); D.C.W. v. State, 775 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (same); B.F. v. State, 747 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (same). In P.L.S., the trial judge conducted an inquiry into appellant’s waiver of counsel that is very similar to the one in the instant case. As in this case, the trial…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- J.M.B. v. State, 750 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- T.G. v. State, 741 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- B.F. v. State, 747 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- S.S. v. State, 744 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- J.A. v. State, 758 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- B.P. v. State, 759 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
- Morris v. State, 759 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)