MAZIE FERGUSON, APPELLANT,
v.
RALPH DISALVO AND FAWN SHANKMAN, APPELLEES
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In this rear-end collision case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the denial of a directed verdict on liability, holding that the defendant driver's sudden stop at a red light in heavy traffic conditions was reasonably expected and did not rebut the presumption of negligence attaching to the rear-vehicle driver.
The court held that the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict on liability because the lead driver's sudden stop was not unexpected given the traffic and weather conditions. The presumption of negligence attaching to the rear-vehicle driver is not rebutted by evidence of a sudden stop unless that stop is arbitrary (unexpected and sudden); here, the stop was merely sudden but reasonably expected under the circumstances.
[1] In Florida, a rebuttable presumption of negligence attaches to the driver of the rear vehicle in a rear-end collision.
[2] A sudden stop by the lead vehicle, if unexpected and without reason, can rebut the presumption of negligence in a rear-end collision.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In Florida, a rebuttable presumption of negligence attaches to the driver of the rear vehicle in a rear-end collision.”
Establishes the foundational rule that rear-vehicle drivers are presumed negligent in rear-end collisions, subject to rebuttal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFerguson was traveling southbound toward an intersection when she suddenly slammed on her brakes while moving forward from a red light. DiSalvo, trave…
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PER CURIAM
We grant appellant’s motion for rehearing, withdraw our previously issued opinion, and substitute the following in its place.
Appellants, the plaintiffs below in this rear-end collision case, challenge the denial of their motion for a directed verdict on the issue of liability against defendants/appellees. We reverse.
We stayed this appeal pending the outcome of Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc., 695 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), in which the first district certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:
Does the testimony of the defendant of a sudden unexpected stop immediately after starting forward constitute sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of negligence which attaches in a rear-end collision?
In Eppler v. Tarmac America, Inc., 752 So. 2d 592 (Fla.2000), the supreme court answered the certified question in the affirmative and approved the first district’s decision. The court distinguished “arbitrary stop” cases from other “sudden stop” cases, wherein the forward driver merely stopped abruptly. Id. at 595 (citing Tacher v. Asmus, 743 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Pierce v. Progressive American Ins. Co., 582 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); and Kao v. Lauredo, 617 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)). The court concluded that the stop in Eppler fell within the “arbitrary stop” category because the forward driver in Eppler “slammed on her brakes, without warning, and for no reason.” Id.
In Florida, a rebuttable presumption of negligence attaches to the driver of the rear vehicle in a rear-end collision. Eppler, 752 So. 2d at 594; Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla.1965); McCloud, v. Swanson, 681 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Pierce v. Progressive American Ins. Co.; Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Tacher, 743 So. 2d 157; D.J. Spencer Sales v. Clampitt, 704 So. 2d 601, 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). If the lead vehicle suddenly stops, but the stop happens at a place and time where it was reasonably expected, then the presumption of negligence is not rebutted. Eppler, 752 So. 2d at 595; Tacher, 743 So. 2d at 158. However, if the stop by the lead driver is “arbitrary” (i.e., unexpected and sudden), then the presumption is rebutted and the plaintiff is not entitled to a directed verdict.
The evidence presented at trial in this case, taken in the light most favorable to the appellees, showed a “sudden stop.” Appellees were traveling southbound towards the intersection of University Drive and State Road 84 in Broward County. The weather was rainy, cold and windy. The roads were very wet. The traffic flow was “medium,” but the appellee-driver described it as “stop-and-go.” The appellee-driver was stopped at a red light behind appellant’s vehicle. Appellant had begun to move forward but suddenly slammed on her brakes. When appellee stepped on her brakes, she slid into the back of appellant’s vehicle.
Based on these facts, we conclude that the case before us falls under the “sudden stop” category. Plaintiffs stop, though sudden, was not unexpected, given the traffic and weather conditions. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of a directed verdict in favor of appellant on the issue of liability.
REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial.
GUNTHER, STONE, and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
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Ortlieb v. Carmen and Tracy Butts, 849 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…ed and therefore the presumption of negligence was rebutted. Where “the lead vehicle suddenly stops, but the stop happens at a place and time where it was reasonably expected, then the presumption of negligence is not rebutted.” Ferguson v. Disalvo, 775 So. 2d 414, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citations omitted). Where, however, “the stop by the lead driver is ‘arbitrary’ (i.e., unexpected and sudden), then the presumption is rebutted and the plaintiff is not entitled to a directed verdict.” Id. The evidence doe…
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Cleaveland v. Fla. Power & Light, Inc., 895 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…of the rear driver’s negligence. It is when the lead vehicle suddenly stops, but the stop happens at a place and time where such an event is reasonably expected, that the presumption of negligence is not rebutted. Id.; see also Ferguson v. Disalvo, 775 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). We note that this is not a typical case where a defendant’s vehicle runs, into the rear of a plaintiffs vehicle. Here, also, there is evidence that the stop was both sudden and unexpected. In Pierce, the Fifth District applied…
Authorities Cited
- Gulle v. Purley L. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1965)
- Pierce v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 582 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Eppler v. Tarmac Am., Inc., 752 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2000)
- Gertrude Tozier v. Jarvis, 469 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
- McCLOUD v. Swanson, 681 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- KAO v. Lauredo, 617 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Tacher v. Asmus, 743 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Eppler v. Tarmac Am., Inc., 695 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)
- D.J. Spencer Sales v. Colletta P. Clampitt, 704 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)