CHRISTIE L. DREWES, APPELLANT,
v.
PETER J. DREWES, APPELLEE
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Wife appeals a dissolution of marriage judgment challenging the equitable distribution of marital property, attorney's fees award, mortgage payment contribution treatment, and visitation schedule. The appellate court affirms the mortgage contribution and visitation determinations but reverses the equitable distribution due to vagueness in the spreadsheet used to allocate assets and liabilities, requiring the trial court to provide clearer descriptions upon remand.
The Court reverses the equitable distribution because the spreadsheet used to allocate assets and liabilities is vague and ambiguous, requiring remand for clearer descriptions of what is being distributed. The Court affirms the treatment of the mortgage contribution deduction as appropriate, though it agrees the characterization as 'rent' was inaccurate. The Court affirms the visitation schedule as within the trial court's discretion. The attorney's fees award must also be revisited on remand in light of the revised distribution of marital property.
[1] A trial court's equitable distribution scheme may be reversed if the underlying spreadsheet or documentation is vague and ambiguous, requiring parties to resort to guessw…
[2] An award of attorney's fees may be revisited on remand when the equitable distribution of marital property is revised, as these issues are often interrelated.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The spreadsheet used to achieve the equitable distribution is vague and ambiguous. The Husband concedes error on this point. Upon remand, the trial court should better describe the assets and liabilities being allocated so as to allow the parties to determine what is being distributed without having to resort to guesswork, as they each did in their briefs.”
Establishes the fundamental error requiring reversal of the equitable distribution and the remedy on remand
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Wife was ordered to contribute $400 per month toward the mortgage payment on the marital home where she resided during the divorce proceedings. Sh…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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THOMPSON, C.J.
Christie L. Drewes (Wife) appeals the trial court’s final judgment of dissolution. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The Wife appeals the trial court’s equitable distribution, contending that it is neither equitable nor clear. There are several errors in the equitable distribution scheme. The spreadsheet used to achieve the equitable distribution is vague and ambiguous. The Husband concedes error on this point. Upon remand, the trial court should better describe the assets and liabilities being allocated so as to allow the parties to determine what is being distributed without having to resort to guesswork, as they each did in their briefs. Because we reverse on this issue, we must also reverse on the matter of attorney’s fees. See Rico v. Rico, 487 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (“[o]n remand, the trial court may revisit the award of attorney’s fees ... when considering the revised distribution of marital property, because ... such items are often interrelated”).
We next address the partial mortgage payment issue raised by the Wife. The Wife was ordered to contribute $400.00 to the mortgage payment, an amount which was less than half the monthly payment on the marital home, where she lived during the pendency of the divorce. At the time, the wife did not object but she then failed to make the contribution for three months. For that reason, in the final judgment the court deducted $1200.00 from the amount owed by the husband to the wife in effecting the trial court’s equitable distribution. The trial court termed this deduction of $1200.00 as “less rent owed to husband,” rather than “contribution to mortgage payments owed,” which would have better reflected what the court was doing. This money was not rent and we agree with the trial court’s disposal of this issue. Cf. Goins v. Goins, 762 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
Lastly, the wife complains of the visitation schedule fashioned by the trial court, complaining that she should have been awarded more substantial visitation. Again, we find no abuse of discretion. See Keesee v. Keesee, 675 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); see also Neustein v. Neustein, 503 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (“the creation of a visitation schedule is within the discretion of the trial court”); Lewis v. Lewis, 665 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
HARRIS and PLEUS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- RICO v. Rosario RICO, 487 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Dean v. Dean, 503 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Neustein v. Monroe Neustein, 503 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Lewis v. Ester Lewis, 665 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Keesee v. Keesee, 675 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Goins v. Goins, 762 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)