BRIAN DURDEN, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Brian Durden challenged his mandatory life sentence imposed under Florida's Prison Releasee Reoffender Act as violating the state constitution's separation of powers clause and other constitutional protections. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision and rejected the constitutional challenges, having already resolved the same issues in prior cases.
The Court affirmed that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate the separation of powers clause, is not void for vagueness, does not violate due process rights, and does not violate the single subject rule for legislation. The Court declined to address Durden's constitutional challenges as they were identical to those already resolved in prior cases like State v. Cotton and Grant v. State.
[1] The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution.
[2] Constitutional challenges to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act, including claims of vagueness and violation of due process rights through a "victim veto," have been reje…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We approved the decision in Woods, holding that the Act does not violate the separation of powers clause, and rejecting other constitutional challenges, including those that asserted that the Act is void for vagueness and that the Act violates a criminal defendant's due process rights by allowing a "victim veto" over whether a defendant is sentenced under it.”
Establishes the Court's prior holdings rejecting all major constitutional challenges to the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDurden was convicted of carjacking with a deadly weapon and received a mandatory life sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act. The district …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Victim Veto cases and more on FLexlaw
LEWIS, J.
We have for review Durden v. State, 743 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), in which the district court certified the same question of great public importance that it had in Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), approved sub nom. State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000), and several other cases.1 We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Durden challenges his life sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act2 (the “Act”). We approved the decision in Woods, holding that the Act does not violate the separation of powers clause, and rejecting other constitutional challenges, including those that asserted that the Act is void for vagueness and that the Act violates a criminal defendant’s due process rights by allowing a “victim veto” over whether a defendant is sentenced under it. See State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla.2000). Therefore, we decline to address those same types of challenges that Dur-den makes here. Further, in Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000), we held that the Act does not violate the single subject rule for legislation.3
Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court in Durden’s case.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion.
. As stated in Woods, that question is:
DOES THE PRISON RELEASEE REOF-FENDER PUNISHMENT ACT, CODIFIED AS SECTION 775.082(8), FLORIDA STATUTES (1997), VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?
. See § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997).
.Ancillary to the issue involved in the certified question, Durden argues that he was improperly convicted of carjacking with a deadly weapon, because his use of a common pocketknife does not qualify as the use of a deadly weapon under the relevant statute. We decline to disturb the district court’s construction of the statute as applied to this issue.
QUINCE, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 358-59 (Fla.2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000)
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- Woods v. State, 740 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Durden v. State, 743 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)