MICHAEL CAMPBELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Court affirmed a six-year youthful offender sentence, holding that section 958.04(d) authorizes up to six years incarceration when no split sentence is imposed, distinguishing the four-year limit in section 958.04(2)(c) which applies only to split sentences.
Section 958.04(d) authorizes a maximum six-year incarceration for youthful offenders without a split sentence, while the four-year limit in section 958.04(2)(c) applies only to split sentences with probation or community control.
[1] Section 958.04(d) permits commitment of a youthful offender to the Department of Corrections for not more than six years when no split sentence is imposed, provided the c…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Campbell received a six-year youthful offender sentence in the Department of Corrections and appealed, arguing the maximum should have been …
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KLEIN, J.
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant’s rule 3.800 motion to clarify his sentence of six years in the Department of Corrections as a youthful offender. Appellant argues that under section 958.04(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995) he could only have received incarceration for a maximum of four years. That provision, however, which does limit incarceration to not more than four years, applies to “a split sentence whereby the youthful offender is to be placed on probation or community control upon completion of any specified period of incarceration.”
Appellant’s sentence was authorized by the next paragraph of the-statute, section 958.04(d), which authorizes the court to “commit the youthful offender to the custody of the department for a period of not more than 6 years, provided that any such commitment shall not exceed the maximum sentence for the offense for which the youthful offender has been convicted.”
Appellant did not receive a split sentence, and accordingly subsection (c), limiting incarceration to four years, does not apply. Appellant’s reliance on Nguyen v. State, 566 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) is also misplaced. Although the court in Nguyen did observe that incarceration is limited to four years, the court was referring to 958.04(2)(c). In Slaughter v. State, 602 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), this court recognized that the maximum youthful offender sentence was six years or the maximum sentence for the offense, whichever is less. Affirmed.
DELL and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
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Decenzeo Whitehead v. State, 784 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…PER CURIAM. We grant appellant’s request for belated review, and affirm the order that denied his motion to correct sentence. See Camp [*493] bell v. State, 777 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). POLEN, STEVENSON and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Duc Cong Nguyen v. State, 566 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)
- Chambers v. State, 602 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)