ROBERT DELAFIELD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2000-12-27
No. 2D00-298
FULMER, A.C.J., and STRINGER, J., concur.
777 So. 2d 1020 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2000) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Delafield was stopped unlawfully by a Tampa police officer, and while the trial court suppressed evidence of marijuana found during the stop, it refused to suppress his identity—the essential evidence for a driving-with-suspended-license conviction. The appellate court reversed, holding that after the Florida Supreme Court overruled prior precedent in State v. Perkins, identity must be suppressed as fruit of an unlawful stop.


Holding

The court held that a defendant's identity must be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful stop in a driving-with-suspended-license prosecution, following the Florida Supreme Court's overruling of Ware in State v. Perkins.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant's identity may be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful stop in a prosecution for driving with a suspended license.

[2] Evidence of a defendant's identity is not different from other evidence that must be suppressed following an unconstitutional stop.

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Key Quotes

“the trial court agreed with the defense argument that the officer lacked probable cause for a stop; thus, the court suppressed the evidence of the marijuana cigarette found pursuant to the stop. The court refused to suppress the evidence of the defendant's identity, however, which was essential to a conviction for driving with a suspended license”

Establishes the trial court's inconsistent ruling on suppression—suppressing physical evidence but not identity.

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Facts & Procedural History

A Tampa police officer stopped Delafield's car after observing it pick up a woman suspected of prostitution. The officer requested the defendant's dri…

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Opinion of the Court
CASANUEVA, Judge.

CASANUEVA, Judge.

Robert Delafield, who pleaded guilty to the felony offense of driving with a suspended license, reserved for appeal the denial of his dispositive motion to suppress. He contends that the trial court failed to suppress his identity following an unlawful stop because the court was then bound to follow Second District case law that has subsequently been overruled. We agree with Mr. Delafield’s argument that his conviction should now be reversed.

Mr. Delafield was stopped after a City of Tampa police officer observed his car traveling down Nebraska Avenue and stopping to pick up a woman the officer suspected was a prostitute. Thinking that the driver was attempting to solicit either drugs or prostitution, the officer stopped the car and asked the defendant for his driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Mr. Delafield admitted that his license was suspended and told the officer his name and date of birth. The officer then placed the defendant in his patrol car while verifying that his license had been suspended for failure to pay a traffic fine. The officer then arrested the defendant and, in the search of the car pursuant to arrest, discovered a marijuana cigarette.

At the hearing on Mr. Delafield’s motion to suppress, the trial court agreed with the defense argument that the officer lacked probable cause for a stop; thus, the court suppressed the evidence of the marijuana cigarette found pursuant to the stop. The court refused to suppress the evidence of the defendant’s identity, however, which was essential to a conviction for driving with a suspended license, based upon our decision in Ware v. State, 679 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Since the trial court’s decision, the Florida Supreme Court, in State v. Perkins, 760 So. 2d 86 (Fla.2000), overruled Ware and held that the identity of a defendant can be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful stop in a prosecution for driving with a suspended license. Our court has since followed Perkins in Turben v. State, 761 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), which reversed an order denying suppression of the defendant’s identity but granting suppression of all other evidence garnered from that same illegal stop.

The gravamen of the holding in Perkins is that identity is no different from other evidence that must be suppressed following an unconstitutional stop. In a prosecution for driving with a suspended license, the essential evidence consists of the officer’s discovery of the identity of the defendant as the driver at the time of the arrest. When the stop is tainted, so is the identification evidence. Thus, the order denying the motion to suppress in this case must be reversed.

Reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to discharge the defendant.

FULMER, A.C.J., and STRINGER, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Garrett v. State, 946 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
    …driving with a suspended license, the essential evidence consists of the officer’s discovery of the identity of the defendant as the driver at the time of the arrest. When the stop is tainted, so is the identification evidence. Delafield v. State, 777 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Here, the seizure of Garrett is tainted, and so is the identification evidence. It was only because the deputy made the illegal seizure that he learned Garrett’s identity. And it was only because of the illegal seizure that…
  • Romuliss Jarvis Hicks v. State, 189 So. 3d 173 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)
    …, should be suppressed where “[i]t is clear that in the instant case the evidence required to prosecute the charge of driving with a suspended license came directly from the exploitation of the unlawful stop.” Id. at 88; see also Delafield v. State, 777 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“In a prosecution for driving with a suspended license, the essential evidence consists of the officer’s discovery of the identity of the defendant as the driver at the time of the arrest. When the stop is tainted, so is th…

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