BRUCE MUTHRA, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bruce Muthra appeals the revocation of his probation for failure to pay restitution and perform community service. The court reverses, holding that the probation order's failure to impose a schedule for these conditions, combined with sufficient remaining time in the probationary period and the defendant's incarceration during the final months, precluded a finding of willful violation.
The court reversed the probation revocation, holding that the trial court abused its discretion. A violation cannot be found willful where the probation order lacks a performance schedule, sufficient time remains for compliance, and the defendant was unable to comply due to incarceration on unrelated charges during the final probationary period.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion in revoking probation for failure to perform special conditions when the probation order does not impose a schedule for their performa…
[2] A defendant's failure to comply with probation conditions cannot be deemed willful when the inability to comply is due to incarceration on unrelated charges.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the probation order did not impose a schedule for the performance of the special conditions and where at the time that the defendant was charged with violating his probation, there was more than sufficient time remaining in the probationary period for the performance of the special conditions”
Establishes the two key factors supporting reversal: absence of a performance schedule and adequate remaining time for compliance
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMuthra pleaded guilty to grand theft of a motor vehicle and two counts of resisting an officer. His sentence was withheld and he was placed on probati…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant, Bruce Muthra, appeals from an order revoking his probation for failing to pay restitution and perform community service hours. We reverse.
The defendant pled guilty to one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle.and to two counts of resisting an officer. The defendant’s sentence was withheld, and he was placed on probation with certain special conditions. Specifically, the probation order provided that the defendant “will make restitution to the victim ... in the amount of $1,200.00” and “complete 100 hours community service.” The order, however, did not impose a schedule for the performance of these special conditions. Approximately three months prior to the expiration of the probationary period, the defendant was charged with violating his probation by failing to make restitution to the victim and failing to perform the community service hours.
At the probation violation hearing, the testimony showed that the defendant had paid $10 in restitution and had not completed any of the community service hours. Moreover, the evidence showed that the defendant was incarcerated on unrelated charges during the last three months of his probationary period. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation finding that he had willfully failed to pay restitution and perform the community service hours. The defendant was later sentenced within the guidelines.
Based on the evidence presented, we agree with the defendant that the trial court abused its discretion by finding the defendant violated his probation because the probation order did not impose a schedule for the performance of the special conditions and where at the time that the defendant was charged with violating his probation, there was more than sufficient time remaining in the probationary period for the performance of the special conditions. See Gamble v. State, 737 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Melecio v. State, 662 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Green v. State, 620 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Moreover, we also agree with the defendant that a violation, if any, cannot be deemed willful where he was unable to comply with the special conditions due to his incarceration on unrelated charges during the last three months of the probationary period.1 See Baker v. State, 760 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Frazier v. State, 587 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
Although we must reverse the order under review, we note that this situation could have been avoided if the probation order had imposed a schedule for the payment of the restitution and the completion of the community service hours.
Reversed.
. The defendant was acquitted of the charges that led to his incarceration.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Thomas v. State, 159 So. 3d 937 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…nson’s due process rights by revoking her probation for a charge not alleged in the affidavit.”), and because his failure was not willful because he was unable to complete his service while incarcerated on the unrelated charges. See Muthra v. State, 777 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (finding that the defendant’s failure to complete community service hours “cannot be deemed willful where he was unable to [*938] comply with the special conditions due to his incarceration on unrelated charges during the la…
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Cleveland Williams v. State, 839 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…irement, Williams’s termination from the program on this occasion did not violate the condition. We direct the court to reinstate Williams’s probation to allow him the balance of the three-year period to complete this condition. See Muthra v. State, 777 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001); Gamble v. State, 737 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. STRINGER and DAVIS, JJ., concur.…
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Harris v. State (15th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2008)…in the batterer's intervention program. Harris was incarcerated during the last twenty-two days of his enrollment period; therefore, the record does not support the finding that Harris' failure to enroll in the program was willful. Muthra v. State, 777 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Reversed and remanded. BURTON, BROWN, and MILLER, JJ. concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Ladon Maurice Green v. State, 620 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Frazier v. State, 587 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Melecio v. State, 662 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Baker v. State, 760 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Gamble v. State, 737 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Guilford v. State, 737 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)