CARLOS L. WOODSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carlos Woodson appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. The court affirms in part and reverses in part, vacating Woodson's habitual offender adjudication because the statute authorizing enhanced sentencing for habitual offenders of life felonies was declared unconstitutional, and remanding for resentencing under valid law.
The habitual offender adjudication must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing under the valid laws in effect at the time of the offense. The trial court may impose an upward departure sentence if valid reasons exist. The defendant's remaining postconviction relief claims are without merit.
[1] A habitual offender adjudication must be vacated if based on a statute later declared unconstitutional for violating the single subject rule.
[2] A defendant must be resentenced pursuant to the valid laws in effect on the date the offense was committed when a prior habitual offender adjudication is vacated.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Prior to the enactment of chapter 95-182, a defendant convicted of a life felony was not subject to an enhanced punishment as a habitual offender.”
Establishes the change in law that triggered the constitutional issue underlying Woodson's appeal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWoodson was convicted of burglary of an occupied dwelling with assault while armed and two counts of sexual battery with a deadly weapon on February 1…
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COPE, J.
Carlos L. Woodson appeals an order denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Defendant-appellant Woodson was convicted of burglary of an occupied dwelling with an assault while armed, and two counts of sexual battery with a deadly weapon. All three convictions were classified as life felonies.1 The crime date was February 15,1996.
Defendant contends, and the State concedes, that his habitual offender adjudication must be vacated because chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, was held unconstitutional on account of a violation of the single subject rule. As the Second District has explained:
Prior to the enactment of chapter 95-182, a defendant convicted of a life felo ny was not subject to an enhanced punishment as a habitual offender. See Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 485 (Fla.1992); see also Lafleur v. State, 661 So. 2d 346, 349 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Everett’s offense occurred on July 23, 1996, and in reliance upon the fact that the effective date of chapter 95-182 was October 1, 1995, the trial court correctly sentenced Everett as a habitual felony offender. However, the trial judge did not have a crystal ball before her to know that subsequent to the imposition of Everett’s sentence, chapter 95-182 would be declared unconstitutional as violative of the single-subject rule. See [State v.] Thompson, 750 So. 2d [643,] at 649 [ (Fla.1999) ]. Thus, Everett’s enhanced sentence as a habitual felony offender is now improper and must be reversed. Upon remand, the trial court shall re-sentence Everett pursuant to the valid laws in effect on the date the offense was committed. See Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000). Finally, on resentencing the trial court may impose an upward departure sentence if one or more permissible reasons are applicable.
Everett v. State, 770 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).
In accordance with Everett, we reverse the habitual offender adjudication and remand for resentencing pursuant to the valid laws in effect on the date the offense was committed. The trial court may impose an upward departure sentence if there is a valid reason. Defendant is of course entitled to the assistance of counsel at the resentencing proceeding.
We conclude that' the defendant’s remaining claims in his Rule 3.850 motion are without merit. We therefore affirm the denial of postconviction relief on the remaining points.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing.
. Sexual battery with a deadly weapon is a life felony. § 794.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1995).
As to burglary, defendant was convicted of burglary of an occupied dwelling with an assault or battery, in violation of section 810.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), which is a first degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. The conviction was enhanced to a life felony on account of the use of a weapon. See id. § 775.087(1).
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Antoine L. McBRIDE v. State, 810 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…(b), Fla. Stat. (1995)); see also Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1175 n. 3 (Fla.2001). However, chapter 95-182 was declared unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Thompson, 750 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1999); see also Woodson v. State, 777 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 796 So. 2d 539 (Fla.2001). The Legislature subsequently re-enacted that amended version of the statute to cure the constitutional infirmity, and the current version of the statute does include life felonies. Suffice it to…
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Cook v. State, 866 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…997. Accordingly, Cook’s habitual offender sentence for the life felony of attempted first degree murder is illegal. Kinsey v. State, 831 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); see also Lowe v. State, 786 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Woodson v. State, 777 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001);. James v. State, 775 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). We reverse the trial court’s order denying Cook’s motion and remand the case for resentencing on the attempted first degree murder conviction. Cook shall be resen-tenced under…
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Green v. State, 810 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…riminal sentencing provisions created by chapter 95-182. See Salters v. State, 758 So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla.2000). Thus, the enhancement of the appellant’s life felony under the habitual violent felony offender statute is improper. See Woodson v. State, 777 So. 2d 1167, 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), citing Everett v. State, 770 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). As conceded by the state, the appellant should [*1102] be resenteneed for the life felony conviction pursuant to the laws that were in effect at the time of h…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- Hollice Lafleur v. State, 661 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Everett v. State, 770 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)