WILLIAM RAY CHASE, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 2d DCA | 1998-07-29
No. 98-01604
Campbell, A.C.J., Quince, J., Northcutt, J.
779 So. 2d 278 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1998) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Florida appellate court denied Chase's petition for a belated appeal filed seventeen years after his 1981 conviction, holding that unreasonable delay bars relief under the doctrine of laches.


Holding

An unreasonable delay of seventeen years in seeking a belated appeal bars relief based upon laches.


Headnotes

[1] An unreasonable delay of seventeen years in seeking a belated appeal based on trial counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal bars relief under the doctrine of laches.

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Facts & Procedural History

William Ray Chase was sentenced to one hundred years in prison in 1981. He claims his recovery from serious gunshot wounds prevented him from knowing …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In 1981 William Ray Chase was sentenced to one hundred years in prison. He alleges that his recuperation from serious gunshot wounds prevented him from knowing that counsel had failed to file a notice of appeal from his judgment and sentence, as had been promised. This year, his medical condition apparently stabilized, Chase has filed a petition for a belated appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(j), alleging trial counsel failed to timely appeal his sentence. The time limitations of rule 9.140(j)(3) do not become effective until January 1, 1999.

The Third District recently held that an unreasonable delay after the incident leading to the failure to appeal bars relief based upon laches. See Hurtado v. Singletary, 708 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (relying in part upon the supreme court’s pronouncement in McCray v. State, 699 So. 2d 1366 (Fla.1997), that attacks on appellate counsel are presumed untimely five years after a conviction becomes final); see also Brown v. State, 711 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (listing a collection of decisions that apply laches to forbid relief seeking belated appeals). We agree with the reasoning of HuHado. Chase’s delay of seventeen years exceeds the periods of delay in several of the cases recited in Brown for which relief was prohibited.

Petition for belated appeal denied.

CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and QUINCE and NORTHCUTT, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Turner v. State, 875 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)
    …. See Williams v. State, 744 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). On remand, the court must strike the minimum mandatory life sentence because the VCC statute does not provide a minimum mandatory in the case of a first-degree felony. See Tullis v. State, 779 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Turner need not be present. Affirmed in part; remanded with instructions to the trial court to sentence Turner consistent with its oral pronouncement and strike the minimum mandatory sentence. WHATLEY and COVINGTON, JJ.,…

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