JAMES SCOTT, III, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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James Scott challenged the trial court's summary denial of a postconviction motion attacking his guilty pleas on the ground that he was not advised of the voluntary intoxication defense. The court reversed in part, holding that a defendant's statement of satisfaction with counsel at the time of plea entry cannot bar later claims that counsel failed to advise of a specific legal defense.
The court held that a defendant's expression of satisfaction with counsel at plea entry cannot refute claims of ineffective assistance based on counsel's failure to advise of a legal defense that the defendant was unaware of at the time. The trial court improperly denied two of Scott's four claims and must reconsider them on remand without regard to the satisfaction statements in the plea form and colloquy.
[1] A defendant's claim that counsel failed to advise them of a legal defense, which the defendant only later became aware of, cannot be foreclosed by a plea colloquy or form…
[2] A defendant's assertion that they would not have entered a guilty plea had counsel advised them of a specific legal defense, such as voluntary intoxication, may render th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it would be illogical and unfair to foreclose analysis of that claim based upon what he asserts was an uninformed conclusion that counsel had been adequate in his criminal representation”
Establishes the core holding that satisfaction statements cannot bar claims about undisclosed defenses
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceScott pleaded guilty to various offenses and is serving a thirty-five-year sentence as a habitual violent felony offender. He alleged he was intoxicat…
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PER CURIAM.
James Scott challenges the trial court’s summary denial of his postconviction motion attacking guilty pleas to a variety of offenses for which he is serving thirty-five years as a habitual violent felony offender. The trial court improperly denied two of the four claims Scott advanced in his motion, and upon those we reverse.
Scott alleges in these two interrelated grounds for relief that he would not have entered pleas to the charged offenses, which are specific intent crimes, had counsel advised him of the defense of voluntary intoxication. He recites the usual require-' ments: that he was intoxicated at the time the crimes were committed; that he advised counsel of this; that he advised counsel of specific individuals who would be able to corroborate this evidence; and that had he been apprised of the defense, he would have proceeded to jury trial. Counsel’s failing, he alleges, renders his pleas involuntary. See Whitty v. State, 687 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Wright v. State, 675 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
The trial court denied these claims on the basis of a plea form and an excerpt of the plea colloquy which noted Scott’s satisfaction with counsel. Arreola v. State, 620 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), and Frazier v. State, 447 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), cited by the trial court in its order of denial, repeat general propositions of law that comments made at the entry of a plea may bar some subsequent attacks on counsel, but that principle does no„t apply in this fact-specific situation. We do not question that such an expression of contentment with counsel at the time a plea is entered will refute later claims that had already come to the defendant’s attention at the time the plea was entered.
However, in circumstances such as these where Scott alleges that counsel never advised him of the availability of a legal defense that he has only subsequently become aware of himself, it would be illogical and unfair to foreclose analysis of that claim based upon what he asserts was an uninformed conclusion that counsel had been adequate in his criminal representation. See Stanley v. State, 703 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Young v. State, 661 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Brunson v. State, 605 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
These three cases involve virtually identical claims regarding counsel and the defense of voluntary intoxication, and all reject the notion that a plea agreement or colloquy which shows client approval of the attorney alone will refute the claim.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to consider these two interrelated allegations without regard to that portion of the plea form or plea colloquy where Scott endorses the representation he received from trial counsel.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and FULMER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Arlis R. Jones v. State, 846 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…ied with his attorney. This alone does not refute an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the attorney’s failure to advise of a specific defense because Jones alleged that his satisfaction with counsel was uninformed. See Scott v. State, 779 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The transcript shows that the trial court neither asked Jones specifically whether his attorney had discussed consent as a defense, nor asked him generally whether his attorney had discussed possible defenses with him. Becau…
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Barrett v. State, 2 So. 3d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…no basis for an insanity (not involuntary intoxication) defense. The tri [*371] al court denied the motion based upon the State’s response. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed a similar denial of a post-conviction motion in Scott v. State, 779 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). There, the defendant alleged he would not have entered a plea to the charges for specific intent crimes had his counsel advised him of the voluntary intoxication defense. The Second District reversed the denial of the post-convic…
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Vice v. State, 139 So. 3d 956 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…comment. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. KHOUZAM and BLACK, JJ., Concur. . In ground two (C), Vice did not make a claim for relief; he argued that the plea form and the plea colloquy do not refute his claims. See Scott v. State, 779 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that a plea agreement or colloquy showing client approval of counsel will not refute an allegation that defendant later learned of the availability of a defense about which counsel failed to advise him). Vice’s argument i…
Authorities Cited
- Thornton Brunson v. State, 605 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Frazier v. State, 447 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Young v. State, 661 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Swain v. Bernie Howell, 661 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Otero v. State, 703 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- Wright v. State, 675 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Gregorio Arreola v. State, 620 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Whitty v. State, 687 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)