BOBBY MCAFFEE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Florida appellate court affirmed probation revocation for willful and substantial violations of reporting and anger management conditions, but remanded for entry of a written order specifying the violated conditions.
Probation revocation is affirmed where the record supports willful and substantial violations of probation conditions, but remand is required for entry of a written revocation order specifying the violated conditions.
[1] A trial court must enter a written revocation order that expressly sets forth the specific probationary conditions violated, even when the factual basis for revocation is…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcAffee was serving probation for two counts of child abuse committed in 1997. He failed to report to his probation officer, failed to file monthly re…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Written Order Requirement cases and more on FLexlaw
THREADGILL, Judge.
The appellant, Bobby McAffee, challenges the revocation of his probation, which he was serving for two counts of child abuse committed in 1997. He contends the trial court erred in finding that he willfully and substantially violated various conditions of his probation and in failing to enter a revocation order setting forth the specific probationary conditions he was found to have violated. We affirm the revocation of McAffee’s probation, but remand for entry of a written revocation order. The record shows that the trial court revoked McAffee’s probation for: 1) his multiple failures to report to his probation officer and to otherwise file written monthly reports, in violation of condition one of his probation order; 2) failing to report to his probation officer as directed upon his release from incarceration on an unrelated arrest, in violation of condition ten; and 3) multiple unexcused absences from his scheduled anger management class, in violation of condition twenty-two. The record supports revocation, based on McAffee’s willful and substantial violations of those conditions. We therefore affirm. Since, however, the trial court failed to enter a written revocation order setting forth the express probationary conditions that McAffee violated, this cause is remanded for entry of an appropriate order. See Rojas v. State, 711 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
Affirmed; remanded.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SALCINES, J., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Badillo v. State, 842 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…ion without comment. However, because the trial court did not enter a written revocation order setting forth the express probationary conditions that it found Badillo had violated, we remand for entry of an appropriate order. See McAffee v. State, 779 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). Affirmed; remanded. SALCINES and STRINGER, JJ., Concur.…
-
Goss v. State, 911 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…e charged felonies, we believe the trial court must specify which felony it suspected Appellant had committed. This is a logical application of the established rule that reasons for violation must be explicitly stated, set forth in McAffee v. State, 779 So. 2d 299, 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). [*184] Accordingly, we reverse for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. If appropriate, the trial court shall enter a corrected order of revocation of probation. See, e.g., Oliver v. State, 819 So. 2d 816 (Fla.…
Authorities Cited
- Hoag v. State, 711 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Freddy Rojas v. State, 711 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)