PABLO RUBIO, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
ARMOUR & COMPANY, A CORPORATION, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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In this negligence case, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a directed verdict for an automobile driver who struck a pedestrian who had just alighted from a streetcar. The court held that the driver was not liable for an unavoidable accident where the driver was operating lawfully and at reasonable speed, and the pedestrian failed to exercise ordinary care by not looking before crossing in front of the streetcar.
The driver is not liable. An automobile driver is not an insurer of pedestrians' safety, and in case of an unavoidable accident resulting from no pre-existing negligence on the driver's part, the driver is not responsible. The evidence showed an unavoidable, unforeseen accident for which the defendant should not be held liable.
“An automobile driver is not an insurer of the limbs and lives of pedestrians. In case of an unavoidable accident resulting in injury to a pedestrian, from a moving automobile, the driver is not liable if there was no pre-existing negligence upon his part.”
Establishes the core legal principle that drivers bear no liability for unavoidable accidents absent their own negligence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff alighted from a streetcar positioned on the right side of the street, then crossed around in front of the streetcar where he was struck …
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Chillingworth, Circuit .Judge:
Plaintiff brought suit for injuries alleged to have been sustained through the negligent operation of an automobile of the defendant. At conclusion of the testimony the Court directed a verdict for the defendant. We believe it would serve no useful purpose to restate the testimony in this opinion. However, indulging in all proper inferences favorable to the plaintiff, it is evident that plaintiff, after having alighted from a street car, which street car was near the right hand side of the street, crossed around in front of the street car, at which point he was struck by the automobile of the defendant. The ground layout of the street, the bridge, the street car tracks, and the curb line, show that the automobile of defendant could pass the street car in no other way except proceeding on the left of the street car, and that the accident occurred in front of the street ear on the track. Plaintiff did not see the automobile, nor did the' automobile driver see the plaintiff until too late to prevent the accident.
As we view this case, the driver of the automobile could not see the plaintiff in time to prevent the injury. He was driving his car where he had a right to drive it, and at a reasonable and moderate rate of speed. It appears that plaintiff ought to have been able to see the automobile had he looked, and that plaintiff certainly had reason to know and believe that there was considerable traffic in that street at the'time he walked around in front of the street car. An automobile driver is not an insurer of the limbs and lives of pedestrians. In case of an unavoidable accident resulting in injury to a pedestrian, from a moving automobile, the driver is not liable if there was no pre-existing negligence upon his part. Florida Motor Transportation Company v. Hillman, 87 Fla. 512, 101 So. 31.
We believe the evidence shows one of those unavoidable, unforseen accidents, for which defendant should not be held responsible.
Affirmed. Ellis, C. J., and Whitfield, Terrell, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur. Strum, J., dissents.
Strum, J.,
dissenting:
While I concur in the principle of law stated in the foregoing opinion, I am of the opinion that upon the facts developed by the evidence it was error to direct a verdict for the defendant. I think the case should have been submitted to the jury. I therefore dissent.
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Citator
Cited By
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Pillet v. Ershick, 99 Fla. 483 (Fla. 1930)
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Griffis v. DU BOW, 114 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
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Rena B. Riedel v. Driscoll, 124 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)…he same effect see Larnel Builders, Inc. v. Martin, Fla.1959, 110 So. 2d 649; McCain v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., Fla.App.1959, 110 So. 2d 718, 68 A.L.R.2d 1194; Stover v. Stovall, 1931, 103 Fla. 284, 137 So. 249. In Rubio v. Armour & Co., 1927, 94 Fla. 761, 116 So. 40, 41, the Supreme Court, in affirming a directed verdict for defendant based on contributory negligence of an adult plaintiff, observed that “Plaintiff did not see the automobile, nor did the automobile driver see the plaintiff until too…
Authorities Cited
- Fla. Motor Transp. Co. v. Hillman, 87 Fla. 512 (Fla. 1924)