DANIEL KEVIN TEAL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Daniel Kevin Teal appealed the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, challenging both his original guilty plea and the subsequent revocation of his probation. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial, finding the claims relating to the original plea facially insufficient on the merits, despite noting that the trial court's timeliness determination was erroneous.
The October 30, 1998 motion was clearly timely as to the October 31, 1996 judgment. Although the trial court erred in denying the claims as untimely, the appellate court affirmed because, upon reviewing the merits, the claims relating to the original plea were facially insufficient.
[1] A motion for postconviction relief is timely if filed within two years of the entry of the judgment and sentence.
[2] A prior timely filed motion for postconviction relief does not become untimely due to the subsequent filing of an untimely motion.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Teal's motion filed on October 30, 1998, is clearly timely on its face as to the October 31, 1996, judgment.”
Establishes that the trial court erred in denying the motion as untimely, as the motion was filed within the rule's required timeframe.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTeal pleaded guilty to multiple felonies on October 31, 1996, and received a probationary sentence. He was subsequently found guilty of violating his …
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PER CURIAM.
Daniel Kevin Teal appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm. Teal pleaded guilty to multiple felonies on October 31, 1996, and was sentenced to a probationary period. He was subsequently found guilty of violating his probation. His probation was revoked and he was sentenced to prison on May 21,1998.
Teal filed a motion for postconviction relief on October 30, 1998, attacking both his original plea and the revocation of probation.
On December 23, 1998, he filed another motion realleging the same claims as to the original plea and adding additional claims relating to the revocation of probation.
The trial court inexplicably denied the claims relating to his original plea as untimely. Teal’s motion filed on October 30, 1998, is clearly timely on its face as to the October 31, 1996, judgment. See rule 3.850(b). Even assuming that the December 23, 1998, motion was untimely as to Teal’s original plea,1 that does not his render his prior timely motion untimely. Ordinarily this error would require reversal. In the interest of judicial economy, however, we reviewed the merits of Teal’s claims relating to his original plea and find them to be facially insufficient. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s denial as to those claims.
We affirm the remainder of trial court’s order without discussion.
Affirmed.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., and PARKER and SALCINES, JJ., Concur. . A review of the record provided to this court reveals that Teal filed his first motion for postconviction relief in July 1998. Before the trial court had ruled on it, he filed the October 30, 1998, motion.
The trial court apparently reviewed both motions and deter mined that the July motion was not sworn. The court properly dismissed it but allowed Teal thirty days in which to supplement the October motion with the grounds raised in the procedurally deficient July motion. Teal apparently responded by filing the December motion. To the extent that the December motion realleged claims made in the July motion, it should have been considered as timely filed as to the October 31, 1996, judgment. See Morais v. State, 640 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).