KEITH EDWARD JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the consecutive sentences imposed under the habitual felony offender and prison releasee reoffender statutes.
The defendant was convicted of three counts of lewd and lascivious act on a child, each involving a different victim and act, occurring on the same da…
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ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge.
Keith Edward Jones appeals three consecutive sentences, each of fifteen years’ imprisonment, as a habitual felony offender and a prison releasee reoffender. We affirm.
Mr. Jones was convicted of three counts of lewd and lascivious act on a child. Each count involved a separate victim and a different act. Although all three crimes occurred at the same beach on the same day, the offenses were sufficiently distinct to permit the imposition of consecutive habitual felony offender sentences. See Spratling v. State, 672 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Smith v. State, 632 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Similarly, we see no lawful basis to prohibit consecutive prison releasee reoffender sentences under these circumstances.
Mr. Jones also asserts that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act is unconstitutional for a variety of reasons. See ch. 97-239, Laws of Fla., codified in part in § 775.082(8), Fla. Stat. (1997). The supreme court, however, has recently held that the Act is not over-broad, and does not violate the constitutional guarantees of separation of powers, freedom from cruel or unusual punishment, due process, or equal protection. See State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000). This court has held that the Act does not violate the single-subject rule, is not an ex post facto law, and that a sentence as both a prison releasee reoffender and a habitual felony offender does not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. See Grant v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), review granted, 761 So. 2d 329 (Fla.2000). But see Adams v. State, 750 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding sentence as both prison releasee reoffender and habitual felony offender violates double jeopardy). We thus affirm the sentences imposed, but certify conflict with Adams.
Affirmed, conflict certified.
NORTHCUTT and DAVIS, JJ., Concur.
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Smith v. State, 824 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…This court has implicitly concluded that a defendant cannot be sentenced to consecutive prison releasee reoffender sentences arising from a single criminal episode. See Spivey v. State, 789 So. 2d 1087, 1088 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Jones v. State, 779 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). We now align ourselves with the Fourth and Fifth Districts and affirmatively hold the same. Smith’s claim is properly raised in a postconviction motion. See Durr v. State, 773 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that d…
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Crossley v. State, 202 So. 3d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See State v. Adams, 786 So. 2d 1168 (Fla.2001); Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla.2000); Crossley v. State, 2D14-4949, 2015 WL 1816940 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 22, 2015) (table decision); Jones v. State, 779 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Harris v. State, 777 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). NORTHCUTT, LaROSE, and SLEET, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000)
- Pollock v. Couffer, 750 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
- Ames v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
- Grant v. State, 745 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
- Owens v. Leisure Mgmt. Miami, Inc., 632 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Spratling v. State, 672 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)